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Abstract One of the key features of the Russian "virtual economy" is the wide-spread
usage of barter and money substitutes. We apply the search-theoretical approach to
Monetary Theory to construct a macroeconomic model, which allows us to analyze the
appearance of money substitutes being issued by some agents of the economy, and the
interaction of these substitutes with genuine money.
We model Russian economy as consisting of two sectors: a sector of old, mainly inef-
fective agents (rms) (1-sector), who can collude so that promissory notes one of them
issues are redeemed by others, while a sector of new, eective rms (0-sector) cannot. The
sizes of the sectors, the money supply, the utility function and marginal production costs
of agents are given exogenously, and trading strategies, prices, the amount of notes in
circulation and the distribution of the money between sectors are found in an equilibrium
as the result of optimizing behavior of agents of the economy and the colluding sector.
The main nding is that in an economy with such structure, the money substitutes
appear and circulate, and it is impossible to make them disappear by changing the money
supply unless the economy splits into two disjoint ones. By issuing notes, the ineective
sector preserves its stability, and ensures the transfer of value from the eective sector.
From the point of view of our model, the most eective way to restrict the usage of
money substitutes is the simultaneous
 increase of the money supply;
 demonopolization of note-issuing large rms, like Gazprom and UES { notes of
smaller rms are less acceptable, and
 heavy taxation of intermediaries involved in organizing of barter chains.
We show that there exists an optimal level of the money supply in the economy from
the point of view of the colluding 1-sector, so that there is a strong incentive for 1-sector
to transfer new money out of the economy, should the new money arrive. This observation
may provide an additional explanation for the capital ight. The more eective 1-sector,
the lower an optimal amount of the money in the economy for this sector, hence the
larger the incentive for the capital ight. It means, in particular, that the investment in
the energy sector (a core of the sector of colluding agents) at the expense of restructured
enterprises of 0-sector increases the incentive for the capital ight.
At the same time, at low levels of the money supply, its increase is good for eective
agents. Similarly, the welfare of agents of dierent types can move in opposite directions as
other exogenous parameters of an economy change. This means that the total welfare for
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2such an economy is an ill-dened concept, and one has to analyze the welfare of dierent
types of agents separately.
We introduce such characteristics of the trading process, as the trading friction into
the search-theoretical approach to monetary economics, and show that the type of an
equilibrium crucially depends on the value of friction.
We analyze how such factors, as the trading friction, the level of ineectiveness, the size
of the note-issuing sector and the money supply inuence the state of the economy, and
show that the stability of an economy with interacting sectors is preserved if and only if
the instability index = the product of the level of ineectiveness, the defect of the money
supply and the inverse of trading friction does not cross a certain instability threshold.
Thus, if the ineectiveness is large, large trading friction and/or money supply are needed
to prevent an economy from splitting.
We also show that if both the trading friction and ineectiveness of agents are small,
then there may exist three types of equilibria:
 without trade between the sectors, with money circulating in 0-sector;
 when 1-sector uses only notes in trades with 0-sector, and
 when both money and notes circulate between sectors.
In the last two cases, both money and notes circulate inside 0-sector.
Depending on parameters' values, either of these equilibria can be optimal from the
point of view of one sector or both. If the trading friction is very small then the second
equilibrium is superior from the point of view of the welfare of 1-sector, so that it does not
use money, but if the trading friction is not very small, the money supply is fairly large,
and 1-sector is rather eective, then the usage of money becomes optimal for 1-sector. A
type of an equilibrium optimal for 1-sector may be optimal for the eective 0-sector, and
may be non-optimal. In particular, it is possible that an equilibrium without interaction
between sectors is optimal for type-0 agents, but they will continue to trade with 1-sector
only due to inability of agents of 0-sector to collude and change the type of an equilibrium
by a joint action.
The equilibrium with all types of exchange is more fragile than the equilibrium with
only notes circulating between sectors in the sense that the instability threshold for the
former is much lower than that for the latter.
Numerical examples show that the economy can change the type of equilibrium due to
a small change of the trading friction, the level of ineectiveness, the money supply or
size of note-issuing sector, and this may lead to the steep decline of the welfare of one of
the sectors or both, and the same happens in a variant of the model with taxation, due
to a small change of the level of taxes.
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50. Introduction
0.1. "Virtual Economy", Barter and Money Substitutes. Starting with Karpov
report (1997) (see Kuznetz (1998)) and papers Gaddy and Ickes (1998a, 1998b), it has
become a widely spread perception of the Russian Economy as the virtual economy with a
number of special features dierent from both a normal market economy and a command
economy (see Guriev and Pospelov (1998), Ericson (1998), Gaddy and Ickes (1999), Guriev
and Ickes (1999), Ericson and Ickes (1999) and the bibliography there). In principle, any
transition economy diers from both a normal market economy and a command economy,
but a word "transition" presupposes a passing stage of a transformation from a command
economy into a normal market one whereas the Russian Economy enjoys several stable
abnormal properties which do not exhibit a tendency to fade out. This means that the
Russian Economy may be in a new steady state, which rises the question of constructing
appropriate macroeconomic models.
One of the key features of the Russian Economy is the wide-spread usage of barter and
money substitutes (see e.g. empirical studies Aukutsionek (1994, 1998), Commander and
Mumssen (1998), Dolgopiatova (1998), Guriev and Ickes (1999)), which increases rather
than decreases as time goes by and is much more prominent than in other Transition
Economies (Carlin, Schaer and Seabright (1999)).
Many explanations for these phenomena have been suggested. Ericson and Ickes (1999)
give the following list:
 insuÆcient liquidity due to misplaced `monetarism' [Commander-Mumssen (1998),
etc.],
 irrationally high (controlled) monetary prices, especially for energy, inducing barter
as a means to eect price cuts[Woodru (1998)];
 tax evasion [Hendley et al. (1998), Yakovlev (1999)];
 ineÆcient monetary and credit systems [Poser (1998)];
 rent-seeking in monetized transactions by commercial and monetary intermedi-
aries, raising transactions costs above those of barter and quasi-monies [Guriev-
Pospelov (1998)];
 a lack of serious industrial restructuring, implying an inability to reproduce value
with the inherited conguration of technologies, production facilities, social obliga-
tions, etc. [Commander-Mumssen (1998), Gaddy-Ickes (1998b), Ericson (1998)].
They also observe that the common feature of all these explanations is that the prevalence
of barter and money substitutes is the result of either bad policy or bad structure. Bad
policy means (among other things) a very high level of taxation and the lack of liquidity,
and the usage of money substitutes and barter facilitate tax evasion and provide necessary
liquidity; bad structure means structural distortions in the economy which make many
enterprises unviable in the pure monetary economy, so that they have to resort to non-
monetary means of payment in order to survive. Ericson and Ickes (1999) construct a
partial equilibrium model which describes the interaction among the government, the
value-adding energy sector and a sector of loss-making enterprises. (For other approaches
to structural deciencies of the Russian economy, see e.g. Polterovich (1998).)
6We look at the structural distortions in the Russian Economy from a dierent perspec-
tive. Certainly, all the factors mentioned contribute to the wide-spread usage of barter
and money substitutes but a model we construct clearly demonstrates that even if we
assume that
 the agents in the economy are suÆciently eective so that they can survive in the
pure market economy;
 there is no taxation;
 there is no price control, and all the prices in the economy are determined endoge-
nously, as a result of optimizing behavior of individual agents;
 the money supply is suÆcient by any reasonable standards,
money substitutes will appear in the economy simply because there exist agents in the
economy like Gazprom, UES who can issue universally accepted notes (IOU's).
As Gaddy and Ickes (1998a) points out, these IOU's typically circulate among chains
of enterprises short of cash and are eventually redeemed for gas, electricity etc. by some
of them. The usage of money substitutes is also facilitated by wide-spread stable busi-
ness networks and relations which help to organize barter
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chains which can use IOU's of
smaller agents. For empirical study of transactions conducted using non-monetary meth-
ods and instruments, see Guriev and Ickes (1999), Carlin, Schaer and Seabright (1999)
and the bibliography there.
Our model also shows that if a part of an economy is very ineective then it cannot
interact with an eective part. All the money circulate in the latter, and the former can
survive only by using non-monetary transactions.
The endogenous appearance of money substitutes in an economy is an old issue in
Monetary Economics; we are interested in money and money substitutes as media of
exchange. In the next two Subsections, we discuss approaches to Monetary Economics,
which we are going to use.
0.2. Wallace's Dictum for Monetary Theory and a Random Matching Model
(Wallace (1998)). Walrasian equilibrium models implicitly assume an auctioneer, who
observing the goods suggested for trade chooses market clearing prices.
Hence, Walrasian equilibrium (WE) models have no role for a valued at medium of
exchange, and since they always assume complete markets, all assets can be traded at
given prices in any circumstances. Therefore, all monetary theories have to depart from
WE. However, some monetary models (like money-in-the-utility/production-function, or
transaction costs models) depart only from Walrasian physical environment (agents, pref-
erences, resources, technology, information structure), while others (like trading-post
models or cash-in-advance models) depart from the equilibrium concept (rules govern-
ing interactions among agents). Finally, there is a class of models which depart both from
physical environment and equilibrium concepts of WE. One fraction of this class consists
of models with an absence of double coincidence of wants.
Monetary theories should not contain money as a primitive { this is Wallace's dictum
for Monetary Theory. Models which assume real balances being arguments of utility or
production functions or impose cash-in-advance constraints do not satisfy this dictum.
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Here the word "barter" is used in the Russian sense: non-monetary transaction
7The main reason is that they do not permit the assets' role in exchange to be endogenous.
This role is given to the assets in a model with no double coincidence of wants. Absence-of-
double-coincidence notion goes naturally with pairwise meetings of agents, therefore one
theory which satises the dictum is a random matching model. Random meetings imply
that agents cannot choose whom to meet with, therefore they have to search. Monetary
search models show how at currency can be valued, how endogenous commodity money
can arise; they can also discuss international monetary issues and address a variety of
other questions in monetary economics.
Random matching monetary models with indivisible goods and money study exchange
processes where, once agents meet, they exchange and part company. However, this
framework is not interesting enough because prices are given exogenously. One of the
ways to generalize these models is to make goods divisible, then the rate at which agents
exchange can be determined by bilateral bargaining. A strategic bargaining model is
due to Rubinstein and Wolinsky. This is an essentially dynamic model, however it is
possible to show that the equilibrium outcome of the strategic bargaining game can be
approximated by the generalized Nash bargaining solution which is inherently static, and
therefore tractable.
0.3. Inside and Outside Monies. One of the important questions addressed by mon-
etary economics is whether the private sector should be allowed to create money. One
concern, which holds for any economy, is what mechanisms could prevent a private mon-
etary system from printing too much money. Monetary models which use random match-
ing to represent a trading process, were introduced in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989; 1991;
1993); for subsequent developments, see Trejos and Wright (1995), Aiyagari, Wallace and
Wright (1995), Shi (1997), Wallace (1997) and review Wallace (1998). Models of this type
decentralize the trading frictions, abandon the Walrasian ction and naturally generate
transaction demand for money.
Recently, there appeared several models, incorporating "inside money", where the label
"inside" stands for "inside the private sector". The word "money" indicates the object
which is used as a tangible medium of exchange among the agents who recognize it as an
asset. In Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998; 1999) and Cavalcanti, Erosa, Temzelides (1998),
Williamson (1999) inside money is given a role both for credit and tangible medium of
exchange.
There is also a paper of Burdett, Trejos and Wright (1998), which introduces endoge-
nous money as a commodity (general good), which can be either consumed or stored and
used as a medium of exchange.
While the endogenous (commodity) money does not require any kind of pre commit-
ment, since the exchange, if it takes place, is always quid pro quo; models with inside
money need incentives of the agents to be taken into consideration. Though, originally,
credit was completely ruled out of the random matching framework, it is possible to intro-
duce some form of credit into monetary models by assuming that either people can commit
to future actions, or (complete or partial) public information about trading histories is
available, or both.
8The rst paper to put partial public knowledge into the random matching setting, was
the one of Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998). In Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998; 1999) and
Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides (1998), it is assumed that a fraction of population -
a banking sector - has access to a private note-issuing technology, while the rest of the
economy - a non-banking sector - uses inside money as a medium of exchange. There
is a record keeping technology (clearing house) in the rst sector and privacy-of-trading
histories in the second sector. There is also a note redemption technology inside the
banking sector which allows to discipline the amount of notes issued by the banking
sector.
Williamson (1999) explores a model with claims on banks as private money. Agents
can choose between investing into low or high-return projects, so there may exist welfare
dominated equilibria where banks hold low-return assets. Also it is shown that in case of
private information, private money may be subject to lemons problems.
In addition to the media of exchange produced in the private sector, all the above
models with inside and endogenous money, incorporate the exogenous provision by a
public sector of at currency usually referred to as "outside or exogenous money". In
Burdett, Trejos and Wright (1998) and Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998; 1999), it is shown
that an equilibrium can be achieved in an economy with only endogenous or inside money
(respectively) in circulation.
The former paper also shows that if the supply of exogenous money is suÆciently small,
both types of money coexist. The work of Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides (1998) deals
with the environment where inside and outside moneys circulate. Cavalcanti and Wallace
(1998; 1999) consider separately economies with inside and outside money.
Our model considers the case when inside and outside money coexist. We visualize
the note-issuing sector not as a banking sector, but as a coalition of large producers, like
Gas, Oil, Electricity companies, therefore we rule out the possibility of bankruptcy in a
sense that all resources are assumed to be unlimited. We assume both complete public
information and pre commitment in the banking sector, which makes it unavoidable to face
certain incentive compatibility constraints in the model. The punishment for deviation is
not the shutdown of the whole economy, like in Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998; 1999), but
the denunciation of a deviator, after which nobody accepts her notes.
Our agents are placed in a standard money-search environment of Kiyotaki and Wright,
in which dierent people have dierent preferences over a large number of dierentiated
goods.
Our model combines more essential features than models in op.cit. The closest to our
paper are papers Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998, 1999), Burdett et al (1998) and Cavalcanti
et al (1998).
Cavalcanti and Wallace (1998, 1999) consider implementable allocations which arise
with inside and outside money separately, they do not examine coexistence of both kinds
of monies.
Burdett et al (1998) consider only commodity money as inside money, so they do not
have to take into account incentive compatibility constraints etc, since the trade if it takes
place is always quid pro quo.
9In Cavalcanti et al (1998), there is a nite number of consumption goods and individ-
uals. Agents of type i can consume good i and produce good i + 1. A banking sector is
a real banking sector with clearing house, reserve keeping and possibility of being disso-
luted if notes redeemed exceeds reserve balance. Coexistence of private and government
money is studied only for the case of discount factor close to 1, but neither analytical
results for endogenous variables are obtained nor the case of agents of dierent levels of
ineectiveness is studied (the last remark concerns other papers as well).
0.4. A Monetary Model for the Virtual Economy: A General Set-Up. We are
going to construct a tractable benchmark model, so that an economy enjoys only basic
features of the Virtual Economy, which are necessary and suÆcient for a reproduction of
an eect of wide-spread usage of money substitutes. The reader may regard some of our
assumptions as over-simplications, but as she will see below this over-simplied model
is rather complicated already, and exhibit a number of interesting features even in this
simple set-up. Further, the model is constructed in such a way that it can be modied
in many directions in order to incorporate additional features of the reality, and when
convenient, we will indicate how it can be done.
The economy consists of two sectors:
 a sector of eective new or restructured and privatized rms (0-sector), and
 a sector of old, mainly non-restructured and ineective rms (1-sector), who can
collude and issue universally accepted notes.
A note may circulate among type-0 agents (agents of 0-sector), and eventually one of them
redeems it for a good an agent of 1-sector produces. Since agents of 1-sector collude, they
agree on conditions for note-issuing and redemption and on the amount they produce
to each other in meetings inside 1-sector. These conditions and amount are chosen to
maximize the welfare of 1-sector, given optimizing behavior of agents of 0-sector. The
usage of money is decided by each agent, and the interaction of all these optimizing
actions results in endogenously determined trading strategies, prices, the amount of notes
in circulation and the distribution of the money between sectors.
We assume that agents are heterogeneous, and we specify their preferences and produc-
tion opportunities so that in any meeting, there is no double coincidence of wants. This
naturally generates the demand for media of exchange.
In the real counterpart of our model economy, notes of such large rms as Gazprom
and UES are accepted because these rms are large and omnipresent, and notes of smaller
rms can circulate due to the existence of well-established connections and barter chains,
which play the role of the clearing house in search-theoretical models with the banking
sector; the redemption of IOU's for goods is wide-spread in the Russian Economy, as
was mentioned above. So far, our assumptions agree with the reality, except for the fact
that the real old sector consists of two subsectors with essentially dierent production
properties { a value adding energy subsector (Gazprom, UES and Oil companies), and
low/negative value adding (loss making) old manufacturing sector. Thus, a more realistic
model should describe an economy with three sectors:
 0-sector (the same as in our model);
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 1-sector (a note-issuing sector of relatively eÆcient colluding agents);
 2-sector (non-restructured ineective old manufacturing enterprises).
By analogy with our results for a two-sector economy, we expect that if 2-sector is
suÆciently ineective then in an extended version of our model with 3 sectors, in an
equilibrium, it is non-optimal for 1-and 2-sectors to use money in mutual trades. If we
make an assumption that the eective 0-sector does not consume inferior goods produced
by 2-sector or 2-sector is so ineective that it is non-optimal for 0-sector to trade with
2-sector on conditions acceptable for 2-sector, then 0-sector and 2-sector do not trade.
Finally, if we assume that type-1 agents are suÆciently eective then type-0 agents and
type-1 agents have an incentive to trade, and if type-1 agents can trade with type-0 agents
independently of trades with 2-sector (so that if type-1 agents are production constrained,
this constraint aects only trades with 2-sector, not 0-sector), then our model completely
determines optimal trading strategies, equilibrium prices, volume of notes in circulation
and distribution of money between 0-sector and 1-sector in an equilibrium.
After that we can take these prices, etc., as exogenous for a model describing relations
between 1-sector and 2-sector. Notice that Ericson and Ickes (1999) construct a partial
equilibrium model describing interaction between a value-adding sector and loss-making
one, with the exogenously given the government policy, which facilitate the transfer of
value from 1-sector to 2-sector and explain the appearance of barter and money substitutes
in trades between 1-sector and 2-sector.
Thus, our model and Ericson and Ickes (1999) model taken together can give the whole
picture. Notice, that for some parameters' values, our model demonstrates the additional
transfer of value: from 0-sector to 1-sector.
The agreed rules for note-issuing, redemption and production inside 1-sector are abso-
lutely natural if we assume that agents of 1-sector are branches of only one large rm as
Gazprom. More realistic model should include several sectors with properties of 1-sector;
in principle, our model can be tractable in this more general set-up.
In the framework of a consistent (from the point of view of Monetary Theory) approach,
the next step to the reality can be taken if, in addition, we allow the appearance of notes
issued by ineective and unreliable agents and intermediaries, who enforce the redemption
of these notes in separate "islands" of the ineective sector { at a cost paid by other
ineective agents.
We plan to construct the corresponding models in the future.
0.5. Pairwise Meetings, Participation Constraints and Incentive Compatibility
Constraints. Agents meet pairwise and at random, and in each meeting, an individual
decision: to trade or not to trade, and how much good to produce for a unit of money or
a note, is the result of the optimizing behavior of individual agents, with the exceptions
of note-issuing rules imposed on type-1 agents by the "social planner" of 1-sector.
The optimizing behavior of individual agents is described by participation constraints.
The rules imposed by the "social planner" may be non-optimal on an individual level (for
instance, it is not individually optimal to redeem a note issued by another agent), and in
order that the deviation be non-optimal on the individual level, it is necessary that the
gain from a deviation be less than the gain from obeying the rules. After formalizing,
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we obtain a group of incentive compatibility constraints. Both groups of constraints are
derived in Section 1.
0.6. Characteristic Parameters and Trading Friction. Agents discount the future
at the rate r > 0, and an agent meets other agents at random according to the Poisson
process with the parameter  > 0. Since one is free to choose a unit of time, one may
assume that  = 1 and simplify some formulas in the model. The same simplication
obtains when one introduces the normalized discount rate  = r=, as one routinely does
in random-matching models.
We consider agents with idiosyncratic tastes, so that for a given agent, only a fraction
x

of agents can produce goods which she consumes. This means that only a fraction x

of all meetings can provide an opportunity to trade. In eect, this is the same as if the
Poisson rate of arrival is multiplied by x

, and the normalized discount rate is divided by
x

. We obtain a fraction h = =x

, which we call the trading friction. If we choose a unit
of time so that r = 1, then 1=h is the Poisson rate of arrival of partners with whom an
agents may wish to trade.
The smaller h, the more eective is the trading process.
Notice that for unrestructured rms, both  and x

are small: such rms can neither
aord to actively look for trading partners, since this is costly, nor diversify their produc-
tion good and make it desirable for a large fraction of agents in an economy. Hence, for
unrestructured rms, h is larger than for non-restructured ones.
Notice the importance of the value of h for a pattern of exchange observed in an
equilibrium. If h is small, an agent can be patient, so that when a trading partner
oers rather unfavorable conditions, she can walk away and wait for a better trading
opportunity to arrive, but if h is large, then in eect, agents have to heavily discount the
future and accept small amounts of good for a unit of money, and produce for a unit of
an inferior mean of exchange; note-issuing agents can issue more notes since the moment
of redemption is in the distant future.
The interaction of these factors leads to an economy with very bad properties { many
notes in circulation and small amount of good produced for both a note and a unit of
money, and according to the argument above, this situation is expected in an economy
with a large fraction of non-restructured rms.
The well-known eect in the Game Theory is the diÆculty in supporting cooperation
when the discount factor is small and agents heavily discount the future. The similar
situation in our model arises when h is large: the incentives to deviate become large and
some of incentive compatibility constraints become binding (we constructed such equilibria
in Boyarchenko and Levendorski

i (1999) for an economy with only notes in circulation,
and similar equilibria can be constructed when both notes and money circulate). In the
present paper, we consider mainly the case of small h, and prove that in this case, all the
incentive compatibility constraints are non-binding.
0.7. Exogenous and Endogenous Parameters. The list of exogenous parameters of
our model consists of r; ; x

, the amount of the money in the economy, M , the size
of the note-issuing sector, and parameters characterizing utility functions and marginal
production cost of agents.
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In order that agents of 0- and 1-sector dier, we have to assume that they have con-
sumption technologies with dierent levels of eectiveness and/or dierent marginal pro-
duction costs. We choose them to have dierent marginal production costs; the case of
consumption technologies with dierent levels of eectiveness can be reduced to the case
of dierent marginal production costs by a change of variables.
The trading strategies of agents, amounts of good produced for a unit of money and a
note in meetings of dierent types, note-issuing rules, the amount of notes in circulation
and the distribution of money between sectors are determined endogenously as the result
of optimal choices of agents of an economy and a "social planner" of a colluding sector.
0.8. Stationary Equilibria, Balance Equations and Bellman's Equations. We
consider only stationary equilibria, hence the volume of notes in circulation, the distri-
bution of money between sectors, the ows of notes and money between sectors must be
independent of time. This requirement leads to a group of the balance equations. Simi-
larly, the value function of an agent in a given state must be time-independent, and we
obtain a group of the stationary Bellman's equations.
0.9. Types of Equilibria. We consider an economy with non-zero level of money supply,
and we mainly concentrate on cases when there are notes in circulation as well. The case
of only notes in circulation was treated in Boyarchenko and Levendorski

i (1999), and pure
monetary equilibria in Boyarchenko (1999) (for more general utility functions and types
of heterogeneity of agents than here).
0.9.1. Splitted Economies. Possible pure monetary equilibria in our case are equilibria
when there is no trade between sectors, the economy splits into two disjoint economies,
and all the money circulate inside 0-sector. We call them type 0
M
equilibria, with 0
indicating the number of types of exchange between sectors, and M stresses the fact that
there is money in circulation.
A splitted economy may arise due to our assumptions that 1) there are only two types
of agents in an economy; and 2) there is no constraint on consumption tuples so that a
type-0 agent can substitute goods type-0 agents produce for goods type-1 agents do. If
they cannot, certain amount of trade between sectors remains in any case; on the formal
level, we must introduce an additional constraint into our model, and this constraint is
binding when the present more simple model yield a splitted economy. If there are many
levels of eectiveness, there may be as groups of sectors with no exchange among them
(petty manufacturers do not buy brand-name computers, and Compaq does not need
goods these manufacturers produce) as groups of sectors who trade among themselves.
The eect of splitting is demonstrated in Boyarchenko (1999) for the case of pure
monetary economy with agents of many levels of eectiveness; since in her model there are
neither inside money nor collusion, starting with certain level of ineectiveness, ineective
agents are unable to trade at all.
Notice that an economy which splits from the point of view of non-existence of sta-
tionary steady states with trade between sectors may have non-stationary steady states
{ cycles or more complex forms { with trade between sectors. The study of such non-
stationary equilibria goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
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0.9.2. Economies with Trades between Sectors. Properties of equilibria and equilibria
specication depend on a note-issuing rule, which the note-issuing sector uses: the sector
may nd it optimal to
 restrict issue of notes, so that an agent has no right to issue notes in some cases
when it is optimal on an individual level;
 allow for agents to print notes if and only if this is optimal on the individual level;
 print too many notes, more than it is optimal on an individual level, in order that
the stability be preserved.
It is interesting that depending on values of parameters, characterizing the economy (such
as the trading friction, the degree of specialization in consumption, and the level of ineec-
tiveness), all possible types of equilibria can be realized (we have shown it in Boyarchenko
and Levendorski

i (1999) for the case of an economy with only notes in circulation), but
when the friction vanishes, many equilibria disappear as well. In particular, if agents are
not very picky, an ineective sector rather ineective, and the friction is small, then only
type-0
M
equilibria are possible.
On the other hand, if the trading friction is suÆciently large then there may exist an
equilibrium where eective type-0 agents continue to trade with very ineective type-1
agents.
Thus, a possible way for ineective sector to preserve itself is to increase the trading
friction, i.e. make the infrastructure worse (by using political connections, say), but if
a policy maker willing to improve the economy invests in the trading infrastructure at
the expense of the eectiveness of the production sector, the economy loses stability and
splits into two disjoint economies, which may cause huge welfare losses
3
If the trading friction is small, 1-sector is suÆciently eective and agents are not very
picky (x

>> h), there may exist two types of equilibria:
 type-I
M
equilibria (only notes circulate between sectors), and
 type-II
M
equilibria (both money and notes circulate between sectors).
In both cases, agents of type 0 use both money and notes in trades inside 0-sector.
Thus, 0, I(= 1) and II(= 2) indicate the number of dierent types of trades between
sectors in an equilibrium of a given type.
Type I
M
equilibrium can be perceived as too unrealistic, but it provides a good ap-
proximation to more realistic situations when 1-sector needs some inow of money to pay
taxes or acquire goods produced by a fraction of agents who do not accept notes at any
circumstances, { if the tax level is not very high and the fraction of such agents is not
very large. One can also generalize our model and treat this situation explicitly.
When the trading friction vanishes, the welfare of the note-issuing sector becomes larger
in a type-I
M
equilibrium if I
M
and II
M
equilibria can coexist. Thus, 1-sector would always
choose not to use money at all if the former does not need the latter for some exogenous
purposes (to pay taxes, for instance). If the trading friction is not very small, the money
supply is rather large, and 1-sector is fairly eective, then the usage of money becomes
optimal for 1-sector.
3
cf. Castanheira and Roland (1995) for general equilibrium analysis of the optimal speed of Transition
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At the same time, at low levels of the money supply, its increase is good for eective
agents. Similarly, the welfare of agents of dierent types can move in opposite directions as
other exogenous parameters of an economy change. This means that the total welfare for
such an economy is an ill-dened concept, and one has to analyze the welfare of dierent
types of agents separately.
A type of an equilibrium optimal for 1-sector may be optimal for the eective 0-sector,
and may be non-optimal. In the last case, the trade between sectors can be preserved
only due to inability of agents of 0-sector to collude. Numerical examples illustrate how
it can happen: when one of the parameters of the model, e.g. the money supply or the
size of note-issuing sector, changes, an economy can move from a region where a type-II
M
equilibrium, say, was optimal for both sectors, into a region where a type-II
M
equilibrium
continues to be optimal for 1-sector (so the latter does preserve the former) but for 0-
sector, it becomes optimal not to trade with 1-sector at all. Still, type-0 agents cannot
collude and change the type of the equilibrium, and if a policy maker wishes to stop
circulation of notes, she has to introduce some additional obstacles which would prevent
an economy from using them; notes will continue to circulate in an economy, if it is left
alone.
From the point of view of our model, the most natural thing to do is the simultaneous
 increase of the money supply;
 demonopolization of note-issuing large rms, like Gazprom and UES { notes of
smaller rms are less acceptable, and
 heavy taxation of intermediaries involved in organizing of barter chains.
Of course, political feasibility of this program is questionable, to say the least.
0.10. Optimal Level of Money Supply and Capital Flight. For type-I
M
equilibria,
we show that for an eective 1-sector, an optimal money supply in the economy is zero,
and for larger levels of the ineectiveness, there is an optimal positive level of the money
supply. The rst fact has a clear economic interpretation: a note-issuing sector can
issue notes on more favorable condition if notes is the only mean of exchange, but an
explanation of the second fact { a positive optimal level of the money supply { is more
subtle. Even in a non-monetary economy, a symmetric steady state does not exist if the
ineectiveness is large: an eective type-0 agent can obtain a large amount of good for
a note when she meets another type-0 agent, and if the trading friction is small, she can
be patient and not accept essentially smaller amount of good from type-1 agents, but if
the latter are very ineective, they cannot produce that much, and prefer not to trade
with 0-sector at all (we proved it in Boyarchenko and Levendorski

i (1999)), and the same
eect is observed when money are scarce. Thus, if 1-sector is rather ineective, then a
non-zero level of the money supply is needed to prevent the economy from splitting. An
increase of the money supply plays a stabilizing role because it makes a unit of money
and a note less valuable, and at the same time, the relative value of a note w.r.t. a unit
of money increases. At some level of the money supply, the note issuing becomes optimal
for 1-sector, on conditions acceptable for agents of 0-sector.
Notice that if 1-sector is not very ineective, an optimal money supply from the its
point of view is less that that from the point of view of 0-sector.
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If the existing money supply is at or above an optimal level (from the point of view
of 1-sector), there is a strong incentive for 1-sector to transfer new money out of the
economy, should the new money arrive. This observation may provide a new explanation
for the capital ight. The more eective 1-sector, the lower is the optimal amount of the
money in the economy for this sector, hence the larger is the incentive for capital ight.
It means, in particular, that
the investment in the energy sector (a core of the sector of colluding agents) at the
expense of restructured enterprises of 0-sector facilitates the capital ight.
0.11. Instability Index and Instability Threshold. We show that the economy does
not split if and only if the instability index = the product of the level of ineectiveness,
the defect of the money supply and the inverse of trading friction does not cross a certain
instability threshold. Thus, if the ineectiveness is large, large trading friction and/or
money supply are needed to preserve the trade between sectors.
Similarly, if a policy maker invests in the trading infrastructure (means of communica-
tions, etc.), which increases the Poisson rate of arrival of trading partners and decreases
the trading friction, without investment in the ineective 1-sector, or decreases the money
supply, than the economy loses stability and splits, but if 1-sector is as eective as 0-sector,
then the sectors continue to trade for all values of the trading friction.
This observation leads to a conjecture on 3-sector variant of our model made in Sub-
section 0.4: an ineective 2-sector cannot trade with an eective 0-sector, but if 1-sector
is suÆciently eective, it continues to trade with 0-sector.
The nal remark on stability issues: numerical examples show that the economy can
lose stability due to a small change of the money supply or size of note-issuing sector;
similarly, this can happen in an analogous model with taxation, due to not large increase
of taxes. This may lead to a steep decline of the welfare of one of the sectors or both of
them.
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1. Model Specification
1.1. Fit the First (Preferences, Production and Meeting technology). Consider
an economy with a continuum of innitely lived agents, the size of population being
normalized to one. Time is continuous. The agents discount the future at the rate r > 0.
Agents are indexed by points on a circle of circumference two. There is also a continuum
of goods/services indexed by points on the same circle. The agents have idiosyncratic
tastes for goods: there exists x

2 (0; 1=2) such that if the distance between an agent and
her favorite good is greater than x

then the former enjoys 0 utility from consuming any
amount of the latter, and if the distance is less than or equal to x

then the agent enjoys
utility u(q) from consuming q units of the good. This implies, in particular that x

is the
probability that an agent will like a certain good.
We assume that u enjoys standard properties:
u is smooth, increasing and concave, and satises the Inada conditions.
To acquire goods, agents search in a productive sector. Suppose that search is costless
and production is instantaneous. Each production opportunity yields to an agent i some
amount of a perfectly divisible good j at a xed distance z, 2x

< z < 2  2x

, clockwise
from i.
Due to properties of the preferences and production opportunities, agents do not con-
sume their own output, so they have to trade it in the exchange sector. Trading partners
arrive according to a Poisson process with the constant rate . In other words, we restrict
our consideration to a CRS meeting technology. We consider the case when the distance
between partners in a meeting is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution U [0; 1]. It
is clear that the specication of preferences and production opportunities rules out the
double coincidence of wants. Thus, we have either single or no coincidence of wants, and
the probability of single coincidence of wants is x

.
Goods are perishable, so if an agent decides to acquire a good, she has to consume it
immediately.
1.2. Fit the Second (Means of exchange and Types of agents). There is an ex-
ogenous money supply M 2 (0; 1). Money is indivisible, and an agent can carry either
1 unit of money or none. These assumptions essentially simplify the study of the model,
and still allow us to endogenize prices as inverses to amounts of good produced for a unit
of money.
We rule out M = 0, since the economy is non-monetary then, and M = 1 means that
the money cannot be used for transaction purposes, since everybody has a unit of money
and cannot nd a seller.
Agents may issue indivisible and perfectly storable promissory notes (IOU's). A fraction
of agents - we call them type-1 agents (and the others - type-0 agents) - issue notes, which
are distinguishable in a sense that no counterfeiting is possible, and collude in the following
sense:
(i) they agree on a rule for note-issuing and an amount of good, q
N
, to be redeemed for
any type-1 note (i.e. a note issued by any type-1 agent);
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(ii) they agree not to use means of exchange when they trade with each other, and x
q
1
, the level of production for a trade between two type-1 agents in the case of single
coincidence of wants;
(iii) each type-1 agent signs a note she issues and writes a date of issue on it;
(iv) they record information about every type-1 agent and spread this information
among themselves;
(v) if a type-1 agent deviates from any of the agreed rules, the other type-1 agents make
publicly known that they regard notes issued by a deviator after this moment as notes
issued by any type-0 agent and do not redeem them;
(vi) they choose the rule and quantities q
N
and q
1
in (i) and (ii) so that to maximize the
welfare of type-1 agents subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (which ensure
that a deviation is not optimal).
The type of the rule deserves a special comment. On an individual level, a type-1 agent
would not issue a note unless she enjoys a positive utility from consumption of a given
good, i.e. an individual agent issues a note with probability x

. However, a choice of the
rule aects all endogenous parameters of the economy and the welfare of type-1 agents.
Thus, it may be optimal to issue a note with probability x
1
> x

in order to increase
the amount of liquidity in the economy and make the outside money less valuable; in this
case, "the social planner" of 1-sector (a sector of type-1 agents) obliges a type-1 agent to
issue a note even if the agent does not like the good. It may also be optimal to issue a
note with probability x
1
< x

in order to make notes more scarce, increase the transaction
value of a note, and receive more goods in exchange for a note. In this case, "the social
planner" of 1-sector forbids to issue a note in some cases even if an agent likes a good.
So a rule for note-printing, as far as the mathematical structure of the model is con-
cerned, is as follows:
 (for the case x
1
 x

) "never issue a note if the distance of the good from your
favorite one z > x

, and if z  x

, issue a note with a probability x
1
=x

";
 (for the case x
1
> x

) "if z > x

, issue a note with a probability (x
1
 x

)=(1 x

)".
When a buyer is of type 1 and has to issue a note even when she does not like the good,
we also use the label "single coincidence meeting".
Notes of type-0 agents are distinguishable one from another so that neither agent except
for an agent i of type 0 is in any sense under obligation to redeem a note issued by the
latter. Hence, each note will be redeemed with 0 probability, and in any symmetric
equilibria, which we are going to consider, it cannot be optimal for anyone to accept a
type-0 note. Thus, we may assume that type-0 notes do not circulate at all, and hereafter,
we call type-1 notes simply "notes".
We assume that any type-0 agent can carry either 1 unit of money or a note or none
of these; a type-1 agent can carry 1 or 0 units of money.
Types 1 and 0 agents also dier in their production: type-0 agents may be endowed with
better production opportunities, so that they suer lower disutility (cost) of production
per unit of good. Namely, we set the marginal cost 1 for a type-0 agent, and k  1 for a
type-1 agent.
18
The motivation is that in the Russian economy, it is a sector of old, mainly unre-
structured enterprises which manages to survive due to collusion, informal networks and
widespread usage of IOU's.
1.3. Fit the Third (States of agents, Single-coincidence-of-wants-meetings and
Participation Constraints). Each type-0 agent can be in three states:
 a note holder (a buyer carrying a note);
 a type-0 money holder (a buyer with a unit of money);
 a type-0 seller.
We denote by V
0
N
; V
0
m
; V
0
s
the value functions of an agent in these states.
A type-1 agent can be in two states:
 a type-1 money holder (a type-1 agent with a unit of money);
 a type-1 agent without money.
The corresponding value functions are denoted by V
1
m
and V
1
, respectively.
We assume that a buyer has a bargaining power which enables her to extract all seller's
surplus from trade. More precisely, we determine a quantity produced in each round of
trade as a generalized Nash bargaining solution, which satises
q = argmax[u(q) + V
s
  V
b
]

[V
b
  kq   V
s
]
1 
;
where V
s
2 fV
0
s
; V
1
g; V
b
2 fV
0
N
; V
0
m
; V
1
m
g are value functions of a seller and a buyer
respectively; and  is the bargaining power of a buyer. Due to the assumption above,
buyers have absolute bargaining power in this model, i.e.  = 1. This also means that if a
trade occurs, a seller produces her "reservation quantity", i.e. the quantity which makes
her indierent between an alternative: produce or not produce.
If a seller and/or buyer nd it optimal not to trade, both leave the meeting remaining
in the same state as before the meeting.
When two agents of type-0 meet, they cannot trade unless the buyer has either a note
or a unit of money, the other has neither, and the buyer wants to consume the production
good of the seller.
Suppose, the buyer carries a note. Evidently, the seller does not produce if she is worse
o after the trade, therefore in exchange for a note, a type-0 seller produces an amount
q
0
given by
V
0
N
  V
0
s
  q
0
= 0: (1.1)
The note holder decides whether to spend her note or not given the amount of good the
seller agrees to produce. We denote by x
0
the probability with which a type-0 buyer
spends her note in a meeting with a type-0 seller. We assume that the buyer trades if she
is not worse o after the trade, therefore x
0
is either 0 or x

and satises
x
0
= x

() u(q
0
)  V
0
N
  V
0
s
;
on the strength of (1.1), this is equivalent to
x
0
= x

() u(q
0
)  q
0
: (1.2)
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Now, let the buyer be a type-0 money holder. The seller does not produce if she is worse
o after the trade, therefore in exchange for a unit of money, a type-0 seller produces an
amount q
m0
given by
V
0
m
  V
0
s
  q
m0
= 0: (1.3)
The money holder decides whether to spend her unit of money or not given the amount of
good the seller agrees to produce. We denote by x
m0
the probability with which a type-0
money holder spends her money in a meeting with a type-0 seller. We assume that the
buyer trades if she is not worse o after the trade, therefore x
m0
is either 0 or x

and
satises
x
m0
= x

() u(q
m0
)  V
0
m
  V
0
s
;
on the strength of (1.3), this is equivalent to
x
m0
= x

() u(q
m0
)  q
m0
: (1.4)
Now suppose that two agents of dierent types meet. We have to consider two cases:
(i) type-0 agent is a buyer, type-1 agent is a seller;
(ii) type-0 agent is a seller, type-1 agent is a buyer.
In the rst case, if the type-0 agent has a unit of money, and the type-1 agent has no
money, the former decides whether to spend her unit of money or not, given the maximal
amount, q
m1
, the latter agrees to produce:
V
1
m
  V
1
  kq
m1
= 0: (1.5)
We denote the probability of acquiring a good for money by x
m
; assuming that the buyer
spends her money if she is not worse o after the trade, we conclude that x
m
is either 0
or x

, and
x
m
= x

() u(q
m1
)  V
0
m
  V
0
s
:
By taking into account (1.3), we obtain
x
m
= x

() u(q
m1
)  q
m0
: (1.6)
If the type-0 agent has a note, she takes into account the amount q
N
, which type-1 agents
have agreed to produce while redeeming a note, and decides, whether to spend her note
or not. We denote the probability of returning a note for redemption by x
N
; it is equal
x

, if the buyer decides to spend her note ever, and 0 otherwise.
Thus, we must have (1.1) and
x
N
= x

() u(q
N
)  q
0
: (1.7)
In the second case, a trade cannot take place unless the type-0 agent carries neither
notes nor money. Suppose, the buyer has no money. The maximum amount, q
0
, which
the seller agrees to produce for a note, is given by (1.1), and the buyer issues a note in
exchange with probability x
1
, following the rule assigned by the "social planner".
If the type-1 agent has a unit of money, her decision rule depends on the note-issuing
rule x
1
.
If the assigned probability of note-issuing x
1
 x

, and z > x

, the buyer walks away.
If z  x

, she rst decides whether to spend her money or not, and the decision depends
on z. If z  x
1
, then the buyer spends her money with probability x
m1
. It is equal to 0
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provided the agent decides not to pay with the money and issues a note instead (given
she gets q
0
in exchange), and x
1
otherwise (given she gets q
m0
in exchange). Thus,
x
m1
= x
1
() u(q
m0
)  (V
1
m
  V
1
)  u(q
0
)
(if the agent spends her money, she is not worse o than when she pays with a note),
which is equivalent to
x
m1
= x
1
() u(q
m0
)  kq
m1
 u(q
0
); (1.8)
on the strength of (1.5); and
x
m1
= 0 & z  x
1
) the agent issues a note. (1.9)
If x
1
< z  x

, then the probability of spending money is denoted by x
+
m1
. It is equal
to 0 if the buyer decides to walk away, and x

  x
1
otherwise. Thus,
x
+
m1
= x

  x
1
() u(q
m0
)  (V
1
m
  V
1
)  0
(if the agent spends her money, she is not worse o when she walks away). By using (1.5),
we obtain
x
+
m1
= x

  x
1
() u(q
m0
)  kq
m1
 0: (1.10)
Now consider the case when the socially optimal (for 1-sector) probability of note-
issuing x
1
> x

. If z  x

, the buyer rst decides whether to spend her money or not.
The probability of spending money is denoted by x
m1
; it is equal to 0 if the agent decides
not to pay with the money and issues a note instead, and x

otherwise:
x
m1
= x

() u(q
m0
)  (V
1
m
  V
1
)  u(q
0
);
which is equivalent to
x
m1
= x
1
() u(q
m0
)  kq
m1
 u(q
0
); (1.11)
on the strength of (1.5); and
x
m1
= 0 & z  x

or x

< z  x
1
) the agent issues a note. (1.12)
Finally, when type-1 agents meet, the seller produces q
1
, the agreed amount of good,
for the buyer. Clearly, q
1
 q

, where q

maximizes the trading surplus, u(q)  kq:
u
0
(q

) = k; (1.13)
and q
1
is maximal among those for which incentive compatibility constraints below are
satised.
1.4. Fit the Fourth (Incentive compatibility constraints). Type-0 agents face no
incentive compatibility constraints, since they make only individual decisions and do not
collude, whereas colluding type-1 agents face three such constraints, when they carry a
unit of money, and three similar constraints when they have no money. These constraints
ensure that an agent nds it optimal on an individual level to obey the rules imposed by
a "social planner" of 1-sector. If these constraints are violated, individually optimizing
agents will defect, and the collusion of type-1 agents will become impossible.
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Denote by V
s
(V
m
) the value of a type-1 agent without (with) a unit of money who is
deprived of the privilege of issuing universally accepted notes. The rst pair of incentive
compatibility constraints is obvious and expresses the fact that the payo to a type-1
agent, when she redeems a note, is not worse than the gain from the failure to do so:
V
1
 kq
N
+ V
s
: (1.14)
V
1
m
 kq
N
+ V
m
: (1.15)
Secondly, we need a pair of non-defection conditions for the inside exchange among type-1
agents, which states that there should be no positive gain from the failure to produce q
1
whenever required: V
1
 kq
1
+ V
s
and V
1
m
 kq
1
+ V
m
. Hence,
kq
1
= minfkq

; V
1
  V
s
; V
1
m
  V
m
g; (1.16)
where q

solves (1.13).
The last group of constraints are conditions of non-defection from the assigned prob-
ability of note-issuing x
1
. If x
1
= x

, an individually optimal probability, there is no
incentive to deviate. If x
1
< x

, and a type-1 agent issues a note in violation of this
condition, she derives an additional instantaneous utility u(q
0
) but her continuation value
becomes V
s
(if she has no money) or V
m
(if she carries a unit of money). Hence,
if x
1
< x

, then
V
1
 u(q
0
) + V
s
; V
1
m
 u(q
0
) + V
m
; (1.17)
and if x
1
> x

, then similarly,
V
1
 V
s
; V
1
m
 V
m
: (1.18)
Note that
0  V
s
 V
0
s
; (1.19)
since the marginal production cost for type-0 agents is 1, and for type-1 agents, it is k  1;
V
s
 0, since the autarky gives 0 for a defector.
When a defector with a unit of money trades, she extracts the same surplus as a type-0
agent with a unit of money, and after that the former has a continuation value V
m
, and
the latter { V
0
m
. Hence,
V
m
 V
0
m
: (1.20)
1.5. Fit the Fifth (Stationary equilibria). Consider a tuple
g = fM
0
;M
1
; N; x
0
; x
1
; x
N
; x
m0
; x
m
; x
m1
; x
+
m1
; q
0
; q
1
; q
N
; q
m0
; q
m1
; V
1
g.
We call it a stationary equilibrium if and only if the following ve conditions are met
(i) it is rational for an individual agent to behave in the same way as an average
agent, therefore we may use the same letter to denote an individual variable and the
corresponding aggregate variable;
(ii) probabilities x
0
; x
N
; x
m0
; x
m
; x
m1
; x
+
m1
of spending a unit of a medium of exchange
in a round of trade are either 0 or positive, and satisfy optimality conditions (1.2), (1.4),
(1.6), (1.7), (1.8) and (1.10) in the case of note-issuing with probability below or the
same as the individually optimal one; in the case of note-issuing with probability above
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the individually optimal one, (1.8) is replaced with (1.11), and (1.10) becomes redundant
since x
+
m1
= 0;
(iii) x
1
2 [0; 1], and N;M
0
;M
1
; q
0
; q
1
; q
N
; q
m0
; q
m1
; V
1
are non-negative;
(iv) all endogenous variables are time-independent.
In the next two Subsections, we will deduce from the stationarity condition
balance equations (1.22), (1.23) and (1.24),
Bellman's equations (1.15){(1.29),
and rewrite incentive compatibility constraints in the form (1.30){(1.34);
(v) type-1 agents choose x
1
, q
1
and q
N
in order to maximize their welfare
W = (1 M
1
)V
1
+M
1
V
1
m
= (1 M
1
)V
1
+M
1
(V
1
+ kq
m1
) = V
1
+M
1
kq
m1
:
1.6. Fit the Sixth (Balance equations). Denote by p
j
a fraction of type-j agents
(j = 0; 1), by N the proportion of type-0 agents carrying notes, and by p
0
M
0
and p
1
M
1
denote fractions of the aggregate money supply, M , which belong to type-0 and type-1
agents, respectively. Clearly,
p
0
+ p
1
= 1; (1.21)
and
p
0
M
0
+ p
1
M
1
= M (1.22)
(the money neither arrives nor disappear).
The remaining two balance equations state that in a steady state, the ow of notes
being issued must equal to the ow of notes being destroyed, and the ow of money from
1-sector to 0-sector is equal to the ow in opposite direction.
In the case when the socially optimal probability of note-issuing is not higher than the
individually optimal one,
the ow of notes being issued is equal to
p
0
(1 N  M
0
)p
1
f(1 M
1
)x
1
+M
1
(x
1
  x
m1
)g;
the ow of notes being destroyed is equal to p
0
Np
1
x
N
;
the inow of money into 1-sector is equal to p
0
M
0
x
m
p
1
(1 M
1
);
the outow of money from 1-sector is equal to
p
0
(1 M
0
 N)p
1
M
1
(x
m1
+ x
+
m1
);
and the balance equations are
(1 N  M
0
)(x
1
 M
1
x
m1
) = Nx
N
; (1.23)
M
0
x
m
(1 M
1
) = (1 M
0
 N)M
1
(x
m1
+ x
+
m1
): (1.24)
(In deriving (1.23) and (1.24), we have used conditions 0 < M; p
0
> 0; p
1
> 0, which
ensure that the model is monetary and there are two sectors in the economy).
In the case when the assigned probability of note-issuing is higher than that at the
individual level,
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the ows of notes being issued and destroyed, and the inow of money into 1-sector are
given by the same formulas as above, but
the outow of money from 1-sector is equal to
p
0
(1 M
0
 N)p
1
M
1
x
m1
:
Thus, the balance equation for notes is the same equation (1.23) (with x
m1
having a
dierent meaning, though), and if we introduce x
+
m1
= 0 in the case of the note-issuing
above the individually optimal level, then the balance equation for money is the same
equation (1.24).
We use the same agreement about x
+
m1
in the next subsection.
1.7. Fit the Seventh (Bellman's equations for stationary equilibria). We assume
that it is rational for an individual agent to behave in the same way as an average agent,
and therefore we may use the same letter to denote an aggregate variable and the corre-
sponding individual variable.
Let  = r= be a normalized discount rate. Assume that the economy is in a steady
state, and consider a type-0 seller. During a small time interval t, she meets someone
with the probability 1  e
 t
. Conditioned on a meeting having taken place,
1) with the probability p
0
Nx
0
, she meets a type-0 note-holder, who likes her good. In
the result of such a meeting, she produces, suers a production cost q
0
, and becomes a
note-holder with the value function V
0
N
. Thus, her net gain is V
0
N
  V
0
s
  q
0
, and the
expected net gain of such a meeting is
(1  e
 t
)p
0
Nx
0
[V
0
N
  V
0
s
  q
0
] = tp
0
Nx
0
[V
0
N
  V
0
s
  q
0
] + o(t);
2) with the probability p
0
M
0
x
m0
, she meets a type-0 money holder, who likes her good.
In the result of such a meeting, she produces, suers a production cost q
m0
, and becomes
a type-0 money-holder with the value function V
0
m
. Thus, her net gain is V
0
m
  V
0
s
  q
m0
,
and the expected net gain of such a meeting is
(1  e
 t
)p
0
M
0
x
m0
[V
0
m
  V
0
s
  q
m0
] = tp
0
M
0
x
m0
[V
0
m
  V
0
s
  q
m0
] + o(t);
3) with the probability p
1
M
1
(x
m1
+ x
+
m1
), she meets a type-1 money holder, who likes
her good and wants to pay with money. In the result of such a meeting, she produces,
suers a production cost q
m0
, and becomes a type-0 money-holder with the value function
V
0
m
. Thus, her net gain is V
0
m
  V
0
s
  q
m0
, and the expected net gain of such a meeting is
(1 e
 t
)p
1
M
1
(x
m1
+x
+
m1
)[V
0
m
 V
0
s
 q
m0
] = tp
1
M
1
(x
m1
+x
+
m1
)[V
0
m
 V
0
s
 q
m0
]+o(t);
4) with the probability p
1
(x
1
 M
1
x
m1
), she meets a type-1 agent, who likes her good
and issues a note in exchange. In the result of such a meeting, she produces, suers a
production cost q
0
, and becomes a note-holder with the value function V
0
N
. Thus, her net
gain is V
0
N
  V
0
s
  q
0
, and the expected net gain of such a meeting is
(1  e
 t
)p
1
(x
1
 M
1
x
m1
)[V
0
N
  V
0
s
  q
0
] = tp
1
(x
1
 M
1
x
m1
)[V
0
N
  V
0
s
  q
0
] + o(t):
Finally, a type-0 seller may meet no buyer who wishes to buy her good; in this case, she
remains in the same state, hence the expected net gain of such a meeting is 0.
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Since agents discount the future at the rate r, the sum of all these expected gains must
equal to
(e
rt
  1)V
0
s
= rtV
0
s
+ o(t);
so that we obtain an equation
rtV
0
s
= tp
0
Nx
0
[V
0
N
  V
0
s
  q
0
] + tp
0
M
0
x
m0
[V
0
m
  V
0
s
  q
m0
]+
+tp
1
M
1
(x
m1
+ x
+
m1
)[V
0
m
  V
0
s
  q
m0
] + tp
1
(x
1
 M
1
x
m1
)[V
0
N
  V
0
s
  q
0
] + o(t):
By dividing by t, passing to the limit as t ! +0 and using  = r=, we obtain the
rst Bellman's equation:
V
0
s
= p
0
Nx
0
[V
0
N
  V
0
s
  q
0
] + p
0
M
0
x
m0
[V
0
m
  V
0
s
  q
m0
]+
+p
1
M
1
(x
m1
+ x
+
m1
)[V
0
m
  V
0
s
  q
m0
] + p
1
(x
1
 M
1
x
m1
)[V
0
N
  V
0
s
  q
0
]:
Similarly, we consider agents of other types and obtain 4 more Bellman's equations:
V
0
N
= p
0
(1 M
0
 N)x
0
[u(q
0
)  (V
0
N
  V
0
s
)] + p
1
x
N
[u(q
N
)  (V
0
N
  V
0
s
)];
V
0
m
= p
0
(1 M
0
 N)x
m0
[u(q
m0
)  (V
0
m
  V
0
s
)] + p
1
(1 M
1
)x
m
[u(q
m1
)  (V
0
m
  V
0
s
)];
V
1
= p
0
(1 M
0
 N)minfx
1
; x

gu(q
0
)  p
0
Nx
N
kq
N
+
+p
0
M
0
x
m
[V
1
m
  V
1
  kq
m1
] + p
1
x

(u(q
1
)  kq
1
);
V
1
m
= p
0
(1 M
0
 N)f[minfx
1
; x

g   x
m1
]u(q
0
)+
+(x
m1
+ x
+
m1
)[u(q
m0
) + V
1
  V
1
m
]g   p
0
Nx
N
kq
N
+ p
1
x

(u(q
1
)  kq
1
):
By using (1.1), (1.3) and (1.5), we can simplify the Bellman's equations:
V
0
s
= 0; V
0
N
= q
0
; V
0
m
= q
m0
; (1.25)
q
0
= p
0
(1 M
0
 N)x
0
[u(q
0
)  q
0
] + p
1
x
N
[u(q
N
)  q
0
]; (1.26)
q
m0
= p
0
(1 M
0
 N)x
m0
[u(q
m0
)  q
m0
] + p
1
(1 M
1
)x
m
[u(q
m1
)  q
m0
];
(1.27)
V
1
= p
0
(1 M
0
 N)minfx
1
; x

gu(q
0
)  p
0
Nx
N
kq
N
+ p
1
x

(u(q
1
)  kq
1
);
(1.28)
kq
m1
= (V
1
m
  V
1
) =
= p
0
(1 M
0
 N)f x
m1
u(q
0
) + (x
m1
+ x
+
m1
)[u(q
m0
)  kq
m1
]g: (1.29)
By using (1.25), we can derive from (1.19) and (1.20) that V
s
= 0 and V
m
= V
0
m
= q
m0
,
and rewrite non-defection conditions (1.14){(1.18) as follows:
V
1
 kq
N
; (1.30)
V
1
 kq
N
+ q
m0
  kq
m1
; (1.31)
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kq
1
= minfkq

; V
1
; V
1
+ kq
m1
  q
m0
g; (1.32)
if x
1
< x

, then
V
1
 u(q
0
); V
1
 u(q
0
) + q
m0
  kq
m1
; (1.33)
if x
1
> x

, then
V
1
 0; V
1
 q
m0
  kq
m1
: (1.34)
1.8. Fit the Eighth (Types of stationary equilibria and the Vanishing of the
Rouble). It is natural to classify these equilibria according to the following criteria:
a) Types of exchange, which take place, the list of possible ones being
 monetary exchange inside 0-sector;
 monetary exchange between the two sectors;
 note exchange inside 0-sector;
 note exchange between the two sectors.
It is possible to show that it is optimal for type-1 agents to sustain a non-zero level of
inside exchange (multilateral trade credit), therefore we consider only cases when q
1
> 0.
b) Which probability of note-issuing is used by 1-sector:
 below the individually optimal level;
 equal to the individually optimal level;
 above the individually optimal level.
The list of possible combinations of patterns of exchange and note-issuing rules is huge
but we can make it much shorter if we rule out cases when there are no trades between
sectors and the economy consists of two separate economies, each comprising agents of
one type, and the case without note exchange between the two sectors. Such a pattern of
exchange is possible if either there remain no notes in circulation at all and the economy
is pure monetary or some notes remain in circulation in 0-sector and play the role of
additional at money for 0-sector.
In terms of parameters of the model, these restrictions imply:
N +M
0
< 1; N > 0 (1.35)
(if these conditions fail, all type-0 agents have either notes or money and do not trade at
all, or there is no notes in circulation);
x
1
+ x
m1
+ x
+
m1
> 0 (1.36)
(if this condition fails, all type-1 agents pay with neither notes (if x
1
= 0) nor money
(x
m1
= x
+
m1
= 0), and hence, there is no exchange between sectors);
x
N
+ x
m
> 0 (1.37)
(if this condition fails, all type-0 agents pay to type-1 agents with neither notes (x
N
= 0)
nor money (x
m
= 0), and hence, there is no exchange between sectors).
Since we assume that there is note exchange between the two sectors, we must have
x
1
> 0 or x
N
> 0. The stationarity assumption and a balance equation (1.23) imply
x
1
> 0 () x
N
> 0; (1.38)
26
therefore we may impose either of conditions in (1.38), and then (1.36){(1.37) are satised.
Finally, we assume that notes and money are not given away as gifts (at least, by
someone) so that
q
0
+ q
N
> 0; q
m0
+ q
m1
> 0: (1.39)
Now, we divide equilibria satisfying additional conditions (1.35){(1.39) into two groups:
 type I
M
-equilibria (without monetary exchange between sectors);
 type II
M
-equilibria (with monetary exchange between sectors).
In Sections 2 and 3, we study type-I
M
and type-II
M
equilibria, respectively. An economy
with only notes in circulation is studied in Boyarchenko and Levendorski

i (1999), and
an economy without notes in circulation and collusion among agents { in Boyarchenko
(1999). Notice that if there is no optimal x
1
> 0 for type-1 agents, and their welfare grows
as x
1
! 0, then we may say that the optimal note-issuing threshold is 0, and we obtain
a pure monetary economy with two groups of agents. We were able neither to prove that
this possibility never realizes nor nd an example of such equilibria.
For small h, there are no such equilibria, since for such h, type-II
M
equilibria are
inferior from the point of view of 1-sector. Thus, the Rouble vanishes from the majority
of transactions, and here is an appropriare almost-quotation from The Hunting of the
Snark by Lewis Carrol:
"It's a Stabilization!" was the sound that rst came to our ears,
4
And seemed almost too good to be true.
...................
In the midst of the word they were trying to say,
In the midst of their laughter and glee,
Rouble had softly and suddenly vanished away {
For an equilibrium was wrong
5
, you see.
4
The reader remembers Chernomyrdin, Chubais and Lifschitz going places and telling fairy tales about
successes of the nancial stabilization
5
As usual, the Snark was a Boojum
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2. Stationary equilibria of type I
M
: The case of no monetary trades
between the two sectors
2.1. Equilibria specication. Suppose, a (non-degenerate) equilibrium without mone-
tary trades between the two sectors exist. Then, instead of M , a fraction M
0
2 (0; 1) of
type-0 agents with money plays the part of an exogenous parameter, and balance equa-
tions (1.22) and (1.24) become redundant. Further, in (1.23), we must set M
1
x
m1
= 0,
and solve (1.23) for N:
N =
(1 M
0
)x
1
x
1
+ x
N
:
By introducing  = x
1
=x

, we can write
N =
(1 M
0
)
1 + 
: (2.1)
Since we assume that there is trade between sectors, with notes as mean of exchange, it
must be the case that x
1
> 0, and (1.38) gives x
N
> 0, hence x
N
= x

, and from (1.7),
we obtain
u(q
N
)  q
0
: (2.2)
By using (1.39), (2.2), (1.2) and (1.26), we obtain
q
N
> 0; q
0
> 0: (2.3)
Further, the absence of monetary trade between sectors is possible in one of the following
cases:
1. In an equilibrium, prices are such that it is not optimal for type-0 agents to spend
money when trading with type-1 agents, and for type-1 agents{to pay with money at all.
By (1.6) and (1.8){(1.10), these assumptions imply
x
m
= 0; u(q
m1
) < q
m0
; (2.4)
and
x
m1
= x
+
m1
= 0; u(q
m0
) < kq
m1
: (2.5)
From x
m1
= x
+
m1
= 0 and (1.29), it follows that q
m1
= 0, which contradicts the inequality
in (2.5), since u(q
m0
)  0. Thus, an equilibrium with properties (2.4){(2.5) does not exist.
2. Equilibrium prices are such that it is not optimal for type-1 agents to spend money
(hence, (2.5) holds), though money-holders of type-0 are willing to trade with type-1
agents. By (1.6), this implies x
m
= x

; u(q
m1
)  q
m0
. From x
m1
= x
+
m1
= 0 and (1.29),
it follows that q
m1
= 0, hence u(q
m1
)  q
m0
gives q
m0
= 0, which contradicts an inequality
in (2.5).
3. Equilibrium prices are such that it is not optimal for type-0 agents to spend money
when trading with type-1 agents but type-1 agents are willing to spend money in some
cases provided they have it. In a steady state, this pattern of exchange leads to all the
money accumulated in 0-sector: M
1
= 0, M
0
p
0
= M . Since we rule out the autarky
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for 0-sector, this case can be taken into consideration only if M < p
0
and hence, M
0
=
M=p
0
< 1. Also, by (1.6) and (1.8){(1.10), we must have that (2.1){(2.4) hold, and
x
m1
+ x
+
m1
> 0; u(q
m0
)  q
m1
: (2.6)
In the sequel, we consider the case 3, with M
0
2 (0; 1) xed. Notice that we must assume
that
q
m1
< q
m0
; (2.7)
if q
m1
 q
m0
, there is no reason why type-0 money holders should not accept q
m1
units of
good from type-1 agents if they accept q
m0
 q
m1
from type-0 sellers.
Set h = =x

, B() = p
0
(1 M
0
)=(1 + ), 
m
= (x
m1
+ x
+
m1
)=x

, 
m1
= x
m1
=x

. Using
(1.2) and (2.1), we can rewrite (1.26){(1.29) as
hq
0
= B()
x
0
x

(u(q
0
)  q
0
) + p
1
(u(q
N
)  q
0
); (2.8)
hq
m0
= B()
x
m0
x

(u(q
m0
)  q
m0
); (2.9)
hV
1
= B()[minf1; gu(q
0
)  kq
N
] + p
1
(u(q
1
)  kq
1
); (2.10)
hkq
m1
= B()f
m
(u(q
m0
)  kq
m1
)  
m1
u(q
0
)g: (2.11)
Since M
1
= 0, the "social planner" of 1-sector maximizes V
1
. In order that the note
issuing for 1-sector make sense, we need a participation constraint
minf1; gu(q
0
)  kq
N
 0: (2.12)
2.2. Some simplication and additional characterization of type-I
M
equilibria.
In Appendix, we prove that it is optimal for type-0 agents to use both media of exchange
among themselves, and gains from monetary trade are positive:
x
m0
= x

; u(q
m0
) > q
m0
; (2.13)
x
0
= x

; u(q
0
)  q
0
: (2.14)
By using (2.13) and (2.14), we simplify (2.8) and (2.9):
 
1 +
h
B()
!
q
0
  u(q
0
) =
p
1
B()
(u(q
N
)  q
0
); (2.15)
 
1 +
h
B()
!
q
m0
  u(q
m0
) = 0: (2.16)
Rewrite (2.11) in a form similar to (2.15){(2.16):
 
h
B()
m
+ 1
!
kq
m1
  u(q
m0
) =  

m1

m
u(q
0
): (2.17)
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The RHS in (2.15) is non-negative, since u(q
N
)  q
0
, and in (2.16), it is 0, whereas the
LHS's have the same structure, therefore applying Lemma 4.3 in Appendix to (2.15) and
(2.16), we see that
q
m0
 q
0
; and q
m0
= q
0
() u(q
N
) = q
0
: (2.18)
Suppose, that 
m1
> 0, which means that type-1 money holders would prefer to pay with
the money, if they had it, even when they are permitted to issue notes. Then (1.8) and
(2.18) imply
q
m0
 q
0
; and q
m0
= q
0
() kq
m1
= 0: (2.19)
By comparing (2.18) and (2.19), we conclude that if 
m1
> 0, then u(q
N
) = q
0
= q
m0
,
and kq
m1
= 0, and then (2.17) gives 
m1
=
m
= 1. From the denitions of x
m1
and x
+
m1
, it
follows that if 
m1
> 0, then 
m
= 1, therefore 
m1
= 1, too.
To sum up: either
 = 1; x
m1
= x

; q
m1
= 0; u(q
N
) = q
0
= q
m0
; (2.20)
where q
m0
is a (unique) positive solution to an equation
 
1 +
2h
p
0
(1 M
0
)
!
q = u(q); (2.21)
or
 2 (0; 1); x
m1
= 0; 
m
= 1  : (2.22)
In Subsection 2.4, we show that if the trading friction, h, is small, then a choice (2.22)
is non-optimal, and hence, an equilibrium is determined by (2.20){(2.21) (or it does not
exist at all).
It seems to be impossible to obtain analytical results for arbitrary h, since equilibria
under consideration are solutions to a very complicated non-linear system in more than
a dozen unknowns.
2.3. The case of small h and ineective type-1 agents. If the economy is very active
and the number of single coincidence meetings per unit of time is large, the trading friction,
h, is small. This means that agents can be patient and wait for a better production
opportunity to arrive. A type-0 buyer with a note will not be willing to trade with type-1
sellers, unless type-1 agents redeem for a note a suÆciently high amount q
N
. This q
N
may
be too high a production level for type-1 agents, since they suer higher production cost
than type-0 agents, so that it would be optimal for them not to trade at all.
In this case, it remains for type-0 agents to trade among themselves only. The economy
splits into two disjoint sectors, a case which we do not consider.
Theorem 2.1. For k > 1 xed, there exists h
0
> 0 such that if h 2 (0; h
0
) then type-I
M
equilibria do not exist.
For proof, see Appendix.
Remark 2.1. In Boyarchenko and Levendorski

i 1999, we have shown for a non-monetary
economy with inside money, that if k > 1 is xed and h and x

are small and satisfy
h >> x

(i.e. agents are very picky), then there exists a non-degenerate equilibrium with
properties: u(q
N
) = q
0
, and  ! +1; q
0
! 0 as h ! 0. In this paper, if we disregard
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monetary constraints, a subsystem in (; q
0
; q
N
) has a solution with the same properties,
but as we already saw, the very presence of money forces   1, under assumption that
there are no money ows between the two sectors. Thus, a possible type-I
M
equilibrium
with large  must turn into a type-II
M
equilibrium, which we will study in the next
section.
Suppose, the economy is in a type-I
M
steady state, and type-1 agents are less eective
than type-0 ones. Theorem 2.1 and the corresponding result for type-II
M
equilibria mean
that if agents are not very picky, and the trading friction vanishes (due to the investment
in infrastructure, say) but the ineectiveness of type-1 agents remains the same, the
economy loses stability. Thus,
if a policy maker willing to improve an economy invests in the trading infrastructure
at the expense of the production sector, the economy loses stability and splits into two
disjoint economies.
In Subsection 2.5, we will show that the stability will be lost even if the ineectiveness
of type-1 agents vanishes with the trading friction but slower.
2.4. The case of small h and eective type-1 agents. If k = 1, i.e. type-1 agents
are as eective as type-0 agents, a problem described in the previous Subsection does not
arise and an equilibrium with interacting sectors exists for arbitrary small h > 0. This
result and the next one, for type-1 agents with small ineectiveness k   1, are similar
to results for a non-monetary economy with inside money studied in Boyarchenko and
Levendorski

i 1999.
Theorem 2.2. Let k = 1.
Then there exists h
0
> 0 such that for h 2 (0; h
0
)
a) an equilibrium exists, and it is unique;
b) an equilibrium amount of good produced by type-0 agents for a note, q
0
, can be found
as a unique positive solution to
hq =
p
0
(1 M
0
)
2
[u(q)  q]; (2.23)
and they produce the same amount q
m0
= q
0
for a unit of money;
c) an optimal choice of a note-issuing rule for 1-sector is x
1
= x

(i.e. an individually
optimal threshold), an equilibrium amount of notes in circulation is equal to p
0
(1 M
0
)=2,
and q
N
, an optimal amount of good redeemed for a note, is determined from
u(q
N
) = q
0
; (2.24)
d) let q

denote a unique positive solution to
u(q) = q; (2.25)
then
q

< q
N
< q
0
= q
m0
< q

; (2.26)
e) as h! +0, q
N
and q
0
= q
m0
converge to q

;
f) q
m1
= 0, i.e. 1-sector would have produced nothing for a unit of money, if oered
one.
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For proof, see Appendix.
We see that
 type-1 agents exercise their monopoly power and redeem for a note less than type-
0 agents produce for the same note to each other and to type-1 agents, and for a
unit of money to each other;
 as the trading friction vanishes (h! 0), so does the monopoly power (we measure
it by 1  q
0
=q
N
);
 as the trading frictions vanishes (h ! 0), so do trading surpluses in trades of all
types.
The next theorem shows that even when the trading friction is small, 1-sector may be
ineective but the ineectiveness of type-1 agents (i.e. k  1) must be small. It also gives
a necessary and suÆcient condition for an admissible level of ineectiveness.
Theorem 2.3. Let q
0
be a unique positive solution to (2.23).
Then there exists h
0
> 0 such that for h 2 (0; h
0
], a type-I
M
equilibrium exists if and
only if
(1 )k  u(q
0
)=u
 1
(q
0
): (2.27)
The equilibrium is unique, and in this equilibrium,
q
0
and q
N
are determined from (2.23) and (2.24), respectively,
 = 1,
q
m0
= q
0
,
an equilibrium amount of notes in circulation is equal to p
0
(1 M
0
)=2,
(2.26) hold, and
as h! +0, q
N
and q
0
= q
m0
converge to q

.
For proof, see Appendix.
Notice that u(q
0
)=u
 1
(q
0
) > 1, hence equilibria described in Theorem 2.3 and satisfying
k > 1 do exist.
If k > 1 but satises (2.27) then remarks made after Theorem 2.2 remain valid. In
addition, if the trading friction and the ineectiveness of 1-sector are small then the
equilibrium quantities q
0
and q
N
, and the welfare of a type-0 agent V = (1+M
0
)q
0
=2 are
independent of the level of ineectiveness, k   1, but the cost kq
N
, which a type-1 agent
suers while redeeming a note, increases, and the value function of a type-1 agent, V
1
,
decreases with k growing, the loss being proportional to the level of the ineectiveness:
V
1
= h
 1
p
1
(u(q

)  q

) +
q

(1 + u
0
(q

))
u
0
(q

)
  k
1
 
p
1
q

+ q

p
0
(1 M
0
)
2
!
+O(h);
(2.28)
where k
1
= (k   1)=h.
6
When the trading friction and the ineectiveness of type-1 agents are small, only type-1
agents have to bear the cost of their ineectiveness, their monopoly power notwithstanding,
6
O(h) is the standard notation for any function f(h), which decays as fast as h, as h! 0: jf(h)j  Ch,
where C is independent of h (and on other parameters f may depend on).
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whereas all the characteristics of the economy observable by type-0 agents (namely, prices)
are independent of the level of ineectiveness.
2.5. Instability Index and Instability Threshold. By Theorem 2.3, q
0
! q

as h!
+0, therefore from (2.27), we deduce
Theorem 2.4. a) Let
k
1
(1 M
0
) <
2(1 + u
0
(q

))
u
0
(q

)p
0
: (2.29)
Then there exists h
0
> 0 such that if h 2 (0; h
0
] and k  1 + k
1
h, then a type-I
M
equilibrium exist.
b) Let
k
1
(1 M
0
) >
2(1 + u
0
(q

))
u
0
(q

)p
0
: (2.30)
Then there exists h
0
> 0 such that if h 2 (0; h
0
] and k  1 + k
1
h, then a type-I
M
equilibrium does not exist.
Notice that an expression in the LHS in (2.29) and (2.30) is equal to a product of the
level of the ineectiveness, k 1, the inverse trading friction, h
 1
, and 1 M
0
, the defect of
the money supply. We call this product the instability index. When the instability index
crosses certain threshold, namely, the RHS in (2.29) and (2.30), a type-I
M
equilibrium
loses stability.
An economy with ineective 1-sector can preserve stability if the money supply and/or
trading friction increase.
2.6. Dependence on Money Supply. Suppose that the government gives an additional
amount of money to some type-0 sellers. Then some of type-0 sellers become buyers,
fractions p
0
and p
1
of agents of type-0 and type-1 do not change, but the fraction M
of agents carrying money and the fraction M
0
= M=p
0
of type-0 agents carrying money
increase. After some transition period, the economy arrives into the new steady state. If
the increase of the money supply is not very large, the type of an equilibrium remains the
same, and in the new steady state
1. the amount of notes p
0
(1 M
0
)=2 in circulation decreases but the total amount of
liquidity p
0
M
0
+ p
0
(1 M
0
)=2 = p
0
(1 +M
0
)=2 increases: additional money squeeze out a
part of notes but slowly: 2 units of money are needed to replace 1 note;
2. the instability index k
1
(1  M
0
) decreases, hence the economy moves away from a
line where it can lose stability and split into two disjoint economies;
3. the weighted average of value functions of type-0 agents
V (M) = (1 N  M
0
V
0
s
+NV
0
N
+M
0
V
0
m
=
= Nq
0
+M
0
q
m0
= p
0
1 +M
0
2
q

+O(h) =
=
p
0
+M
2
q

+O(h)
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increases, provided M is not large (an optimal amount M from the point of view of
0-sector can be obtained as a maximizer for
V (M
0
) =
p
0
(1 +M
0
)
2
q
0
(M
0
);
where q
0
(M
0
) is a unique positive solution to (2.23));
4. eective type-1 agents prefer to have no money in economy at all:
Theorem 2.5. If the trading friction is small, and type-1 agents are eective: k = 1,
then their welfare decreases with M growing.
(proof in Appendix), and hence, the same is true if their ineectiveness k   1 is positive
but small. In general, for a given k > 1, there exist a minimal positive level M

=M

(k)
such that if M < M

(k), the economy splits (M

can be found from (2.27)), and an
optimal level M

(k) M

(k), which maximizes the welfare of 1-sector. If k is not large,
an optimal money supply from the point of view of 1-sector is smaller than an optimal
money supply from the point of view of 0-sector, but for large k, it is the other way round.
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3. Stationary equilibria of type II
M
: The case of trades of all types
3.1. Main Results. Due to more complex pattern of exchange, it is more diÆcult to
obtain analytical results, and constructions become long. So, we prefer to describe the
main results rst, next discuss some numerical examples, and only after that give explicit
formulations and proofs.
We consider the case of not very picky agents and not very large money supply; the
trading friction is assumed to be small, and here are the main results:
1. When the trading friction is small, in a "good"
7
type-II
M
monetary equilibrium,
1-sector issues notes below the individually optimal level, and a type-1 money holder pays
with a note whenever allowed to. In other words, for a type-1 agent, it is individually
optimal to pay with notes always, but the "social planner" of 1-sector restricts note-issuing
in order to maximize the welfare of the sector.
2. In a type-II
M
equilibrium, a 1-sector accumulates more money per capita than
0-sector.
3. If the trading friction vanishes faster than the ineectiveness of 1-sector, any economy
with trade between sectors loses stability and splits.
4. Type-II
M
equilibria are more fragile than type-I
M
equilibria.
5. If the trading friction is very small, monetary trade between sectors may exist only
if type-1 agents need an inow of money for some exogenous (from the point of view of
our model) purposes, for instance, to pay taxes; otherwise, it is optimal for them not to
use money at all.
Of course, to include taxation, our model should be modied but its structure will
remain essentially the same.
6. In the preceding Section, we have reduced the initial problem to a relatively simple
equation (which admits an explicit solution in the case of the Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion, so that it is possible to obtain analytic expressions for all endogenous variables);
here we manage to reduce the initial problem to a maximization of a rather complicated
function on an interval (0; 1), subject to a non-strict inequality. From the computational
point of view, to solve such a problem and calculate equilibrium values of endogeneous
variables is easy, and the corresponding procedures are robust and do not require much
time of a PC, but an analytical solution is impossible even for simplest utility functions.
3.2. Numerical Examples. We consider the Cobb-Douglas utility u(q) = dq

, where
d > 0 and  2 (0; 1).
In the rst example, we x h and p
1
, and vary the ineectiveness level and the money
supply. In Fig.3.1, we plot the gain of 1-sector from trade with 0-sector. A plane in the
left corner (zero gain) indicates a region where the economy splits into two disjoint ones.
In the right corner, there is a region where a type-II
M
equilibrium becomes superior from
the point of view of 1-sector. The region is more clearly seen on Fig.3.2, where we plot
the weighted value function of type-0 agents. A type-II
M
equilibrium becomes optimal
for type-0 agents only where the money supply is not small, and the ineectiveness of
7
If agents are very picky, i.e. they are too specialized in consumption, there may exist "bad" equilibria
when too many notes circulate and the production level is too low
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agents is small; with M increasing, an admissible level of ineectiveness increases as well.
It is interesting to note that for moderate levels of money supply, the change of the type
of an equilibrium from I
M
to II
M
yields a sharp decline of the welfare for 0-sector, and
only for fairly large values of M , a type-II
M
equilibrium becomes superior to a type-I
M
equilibrium from the point of view of type-0 agents. However, the next picture (Fig.3.3)
shows that
for large values of M , it is optimal for type-0 agents to severe all contacts with 1-sector,
and if they happen to continue to trade with 1-sector, it is due to their inability to collude
and change the type of the equilibrium. If they could, an increase of the money supply
would have made the economy to split; type-1 agents would have become worse o, but
type-0 agents { better o.
In Fig.3.2, it is also clearly seen that
the same change of the money supply, at the same existing level, can lead to opposite
eects: at small levels of ineectiveness, an increase of M may cause the welfare of type-0
agents to drop, but at larger values { to jump.
Roughly speaking,
an increase of the money supply is good for type-0 agents, if the money supply is not
already large, and type-1 agents are rather ineective; otherwise, a decrease of the money
supply may be better.
As far as ineective agents are concerned, Fig.3.1 shows that
if the ineectiveness is not large, the note-issuing sector can preserve its note-issuing
role and hence remain alive
8
even for low levels of money supply, but the larger the in-
eectiveness, the higher level of money supply is needed to activate the ineective sector
and make it alive and well. This activation is welfare-improving for the eective sector,
too.
This consideration can be reversed, of course:
if 1-sector is very ineective, then even moderate decrease of money supply can make
it eectively die, and a disappearance of an additional source of liquidity and some of
trading partners from an economy causes the welfare of eective agents to drop.
In Fig. 3.4{3.7, we plot amounts of good produced (or redeemed) by dierent agents for
a unit of money or a note. We see that apart of jumps, where the type of an equilibrium
changes, an increase of money supply causes the quantities to decrease.
Very similar pictures obtain when we xM and allow p
1
, the size of 1-sector, to change,
and the same is true if we take M = p
1
M

, where M

is xed. The lines of transition
from one type of equilibrium to another one, and the surfaces are of essentially the same
shape (only the locations change a little). We do not show the pictures here in order to
save the space, but make some comments.
The rst general remark is:
p
1
, the size of 1-sector, and M , the money supply, play essentially the same stabilizing
role for 1-sector, so all conclusions made above remain valid if we replace M by M + p
1
.
8
In the sense: continue to trade with 0-sector; if we introduce the taxation into our model, an isolated
sector will be unable to earn money to pay taxes and its agents will become bankrupt
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In particular, there is "the strength in numbers eect" for the ineective sector: when
the sector is suÆciently large, it will survive at any level of the money supply.
The second remark concerns a more general version of our model, with agents of varying
level of ineectiveness:
there is a multiplicative eect of an increase of money supply: rst, it allows for some
of ineective agents to get activated, and the resulting increase of the size of an alive part
of 1-sector activates some of even less eective agents, and so on { till the point, where
there is an essential dierence in the eectiveness of "alive" and "dead" agents. This
"snow-balling eect" can push an economy into the region, where the welfare of eective
type-0 agents is much lower than that in an initial state with a bit lower level of money
supply.
Once again, this consideration can be reversed:
if, for a given level of money supply and size of an alive part of 1-sector, the ineec-
tiveness of the latter is close to a critical point, then a small decrease of money supply
can lead to a rapid contraction of 1-sector.
We may say that the ineective sector behaves like a "black hole": a small one quickly
evaporates, and a large one is getting larger and larger.
In the next example, we x p
1
= 0:3, and M = 0:2, and vary h and k
1
. For small values
of h, a transition line, which separates type-0
M
and type-I
M
equilibria, is clearly seen. A
type-II
M
equilibrium becomes optimal only when h is not very small, and the ineective-
ness is small; the larger the h, the larger values of ineectivness become admissible.
In agreement with analytical results, we see that when h vanishes, q
m0
in pure monetary
equilibria and q
0
; q
N
; q
m0
in type-I
M
equilibria stabilize (to q

= 1, of course), and gains
from trade with 0-sector, for 1-sector, become a linear decreasing function in k
1
.
With h growing, value functions and amounts of good produced or redeemed decrease
(once again, not at transition lines, where they can jump or drop.)
To end the discussion of numerical examples, we note that if h is not very small, then all
conclusions made after the rst example essentially remain valid if we replace M with h
 1
or with d. In particular, a small change of the trading friction or consumption technology
can produce "snow-balling eects" described above.
3.3. Specication of Type-II
M
equilibria. Since we assume that there is trade be-
tween sectors, with notes as a medium of exchange, it must be the case that x
1
> 0, and
(1.38) gives x
N
> 0, hence x
N
= x

, and from (1.7), we obtain
x
N
= x

; and u(q
N
)  q
0
: (3.1)
By using (1.39), (3.1), (1.2) and (1.26), we deduce
q
N
> 0; q
0
> 0: (3.2)
Further, since we consider equilibria with money ows between sectors, it is necessary
that x
m
> 0 and x
m1
+ x
+
m1
> 0; then on the strength of (1.6),
x
m
= x

; and u(q
m1
)  q
m0
; (3.3)
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and from (1.8) and (1.10),
u(q
m0
)  kq
m1
: (3.4)
We assume that k 2 [1; C
0
], where C
0
> 1 is independent of other parameters; then (3.3)
and (3.4) and properties of u imply that q
m1
and q
m0
are bounded and bounded away
from 0: there exist C; c > 0 such that for any h and k 2 [1; C
0
],
c  q
m0
 C; c  q
m1
 C: (3.5)
Lemma 3.1.
x
m0
= x

; and u(q
m0
)  q
m0
: (3.6)
Proof. By (1.4), the statements in (3.6) are equivalent. Suppose, that u(q
m0
) < q
m0
.
Then from (3.4), q
m0
> kq
m1
, and from (3.3), u(q
m1
) > u(q
m0
), which is equivalent to
q
m1
> q
m0
. But k  1 and q
m1
> 0, which leads to a contradiction. 
To simplify the study of type-II
M
equilibria, we make two assumptions:
h=x

 ; (3.7)
where  > 0 is suÆciently small, i.e. agents are not very picky, and
M < p
1
; (3.8)
which means that a fraction of type-1 money holders is bounded away from 1: from (3.3)
and (1.22),
M
1
M=p
1
< 1: (3.9)
As we will show, these two conditions exclude "bad" equilibria with x
1
 1, when too
many notes are being issued and equilibrium quantities are small (in Theorem 2.2 in
Boyarchenko and Levendorski

i 1999, we constructed such equilibria for an economy with
only notes in circulation, and if h=x

>> 1, it is possible to construct type-II
M
equilibria
with similar properties.)
By using (3.4) and (1.24), we obtain
M
0
! 0 () 1 M
0
 N ! 0 () N ! 1; (3.10)
and from (1.23), (3.4) and (3.5), it follows that
1 M
0
 N ! 0 ()  ! +1;
where  = x
1
=x

; to be more precise, there exist C; c > 0 such that
c=  1 N  M
0
 C=: (3.11)
Lemma 3.2. There exists 
0
> 0 such that if  2 (0; 
0
], then in any type-II
M
equilibrium,
x
0
= x

; and u(q
0
)  q
0
: (3.12)
Proof in Appendix.
Lemma 3.3. There exists 
0
> 0 such that if (3.7) holds with  2 (0; 
0
], then in any
type-II
M
equilibrium,  2 (0; 1), and x
m1
= 0.
Proof in Appendix.
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3.4. A "good" type-II
M
equilibrium. Fix  2 (0; 1), divide (1.23) and (1.24) by x

,
using x
N
= x
m
= x

, x
1
=x

=  and (x
m1
+ x
+
m1
)=x

= 1  :
(1 N  M
0
) = N;
M
0
(1 M
1
) = (1 M
0
 N)M
1
(1  ):
By using (1.22) and these two equalities, we nd
M
1
= (M   p
0
M
0
)=p
1
; (3.13)
N =
(1 M
0
)
1 + 
; (1 M
0
 N) =
1 M
0
1 + 
; (3.14)
where M
0
=M
0
() is a positive solution to an equation
2p
0
M
2
0
+M
0
(1 + (p
1
  p
0
  2M)) +M(   1) = 0: (3.15)
Lemma 3.4. a) For any  2 (0; 1), a positive root of an equation (3.15) exists, is unique,
and satises M
0
2 (0;M).
b) If  = 0, (3.15) has one root M
0
=M .
c) M
0
= M
0
() is continuous on [0; 1).
Proof. a) Since 2p
0
> 0 and M(   1) < 0, one of solutions is positive, and the other {
negative, and to prove that M
0
< M , it suÆces to check that with M
0
= M , the LHS is
positive. But this is straightforward.
b) Evident.
c) The continuity on (0; 1) follows from the Implicit Function Theorem. To prove the
continuity at  = 0, we note that from (3.15), M
0
()!M as  ! 0. 
Now from (1.21) and (3.13) it follows thatM
1
> M , i.e. in a "good" type-II
M
equilibrium,
1-sector accumulates more money per capita than 0-sector.
For  2 [0; 1), set B() = p
0
(1  M
0
())=(1 + ), and notice that since M
0
 M < 1,
B() is bounded away from 0 uniformly in h. Having in mind that M
0
and M
1
are
uniquely dened by a choice of , and using (3.14), we rewrite (1.26){(1.29) as follows
hq
0
= B()(u(q
0
)  q
0
) + p
1
(u(q
N
)  q
0
); (3.16)
hq
m0
= B()(u(q
m0
)  q
m0
) + p
1
(1 M
1
())(u(q
m1
)  q
m0
); (3.17)
hV
1
= B()(u(q
0
)  kq
N
) + p
1
(u(q
1
)  kq
1
); (3.18)
hkq
m1
= B()(1  )(u(q
m0
)  kq
m1
): (3.19)
Lemma 3.5. There exists h
0
> 0 such that for any h 2 (0; h
0
], in a "good" type-II
M
equilibrium,
a) q
1
= q

;
b) incentive compatibility constraints (1.30){(1.34) are satised;
c) a condition (1.8) is redundant, and
d)
u(q
N
) = q
0
: (3.20)
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Proof in Appendix.
Now, for a given  2 [0; 1), we can dene step be step:
M
0
=M
0
() from (3.15);
M
1
=M
1
() from (3.13);
q
0
= q
0
() from
hq
0
= B()(u(q
0
)  q
0
) (3.21)
(due to properties of u, a positive solution to (3.21) exists, and it is unique);
q
N
() = u
 1
(q
0
());
q
m1
= q
m1
(; q
m0
) as a function of q
m0
and :
q
m1
= k
 1
 
1 +
h
B()(1  )
!
 1
u(q
m0
); (3.22)
by substituting (3.22) into (3.17), we obtain an equation
hq
m0
= B()(u(q
m0
)  q
m0
) + p
1
(1 M
1
())(u(q
m1
(; q
m0
))  q
m0
):
(3.23)
For  xed, (3.23) can be written in the form
Aq = v(q);
where A is a positive constant, and v satises the same conditions as u, namely, v is in-
creasing, concave and satises the Inada conditions (the verication of all these properties
is straightforward). Hence, (3.23) has a (unique) positive solution q
m0
= q
m0
(), and after
that, (3.22) denes q
m1
as a function of .
We see that 1-sector maximizes a function
() = h
 1
B()(u(q
0
)  kq
N
) +M
1
()kq
m1
();
on (0; 1), subject to (3.3), (3.4) and (3.6); inequalities (1.35), (1.36), (1.39), (3.1), (3.2)
and (3.12) are satised by construction. Since q
m0
> 0, (3.22) gives q
m1
> 0, and (3.19)
implies (3.4). Thus, (3.4) is redundant. Further, let (3.6) be violated: u(q
m0
) < q
m0
.
Then (3.22) gives q
m1
< q
m0
, and since u is increasing, u(q
m1
) < u(q
m0
) < q
m0
, i.e. (3.3)
is violated, too. Thus, a pair of constraints (3.3), (3.6) is equivalent to one constraint
(3.3). Hence, the only remaining constraint is (3.3).
On the strength of (3.5) and (3.19),  is bounded away from 1:   c, where c < 1 (in
the next subsection, we will show that  is bounded away from 1 uniformly in h;M; p
0
; k:
there exists c 2 (0; 1) such that   c, for all h 2 (0; 1];M < 1; p
0
2 (0; 1), and k  1,
in any type-II
M
equilibrium). Hence, we may assume that 1-sector maximizes  on a set
J n 0, where
J = f 2 [0; c] j u(q
m1
())  q
m0
()g:
In order that the trade with 0-sector make sense, it is necessary that (), the gain from
trade of a type-1 agent with 0-sector, be non-negative. In the next subsection, we will
show that if M > 0 and J is non-empty, then  is positive on J , hence there is no need
to introduce an additional constraint.
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Theorem 3.6. For any M
1
< 1, there exist C > 0 and h
0
> 0 such that if h 2 (0; h
0
]
and x

 Ch, then
a) a type-II
M
equilibrium exists if and only if J 6= ;, and the maximum of  on J is
attained at a point  > 0;
b) if conditions in a) are satised, then an optimal  maximizes W on J, and optimal
q
0
; q
N
, etc. are dened by this  as described above;
c) if conditions in a) are satised, then q
0
= q

+O(h), as h! 0, and the same is true
for q
N
, q
m0
, and q
m1
.
Proof. a) J is a subset of a compact [0; c], which is dened by non-strict inequalities for
continuous functions, hence J is compact. By continuity of M
0
= M
0
() and u, and
applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (3.21) and (3.23), we see that q
0
; q
N
; q
m0
; q
m1
are continuous, hence  is continuous, and the maximum of  on J exists if and only if
J is non-empty. If the maximum is achieved at some  > 0, it is an optimal choice for
1-sector, and if the maximum is attained only at 0, then an optimization problem on J n0
has no solution.
b) is evident, and c) will be proved in Appendix. 
Remark 3.1. For some parameters' values, J is empty. For instance, the following
"nonexistence-of-type-II
M
-equilibria" theorem holds:
Theorem 3.7. Let M < p
1
. There exist C > 0 and h
0
> 0 such that if h 2 (0; h
0
],
x

 Ch, and k  1 + Ch, then a type-II
M
equilibrium does not exist.
Proof in Appendix.
Corollary 3.8. Let M < p
1
. There exist C > 0 and h
0
> 0 such that if h 2 (0; h
0
],
x

 Ch, and k  1 + Ch, then no non-degenerate equilibria exist.
Proof. In Section 2, we have shown that under these conditions, a type-I
M
equilibrium
does not exist as well, and in Boyarchenko and Levendorski

i (1999) and Boyarchenko
(1999) the same has been shown for economies without money and notes, respectively. 
Thus,
If the trading friction vanishes faster than the ineectiveness of 1-sector, then any
economy with an ineective 1-sector loses stability and splits into disjoint parts.
3.5. Some asymptotic analysis. Here we derive asymptotic formulas for equilibrium
quantities as h ! 0, which allow us to nd approximate conditions of existence of equi-
libria, approximate formulas for value functions, and compare type-II
M
and type-I
M
equilibria.
By Theorem 3.7, we may assume that k = 1 + k
1
h, where k
1
= O(1) as h ! 0;
for simplicity, we assume that k
1
is a non-negative constant, and in the end, formulate
existence (nonexistence) conditions in terms of k
1
.
Lemma 3.9. a) As h! +0,
() = 
0
() +O(h); (3.24)
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where

0
() = q

B()
 
u
0
(q

)q
01
 
q
01
u
0
(q

)
  k
1
!
+M
1
q

=
= q

 

u
0
(q

) + 1
u
0
(q

)
  k
1
B() +M
1
()
!
: (3.25)
b) There exists C > 0 such that for  2 J,
()  q

(

1  
+M)  Ch;
and hence, for small h,  is positive on J.
c) A set
J
0
= f 2 [0; 1) j
u
0
(q

) + 1
u
0
(q

)
 
k
1
p
0
(1 M
0
())
1 + 
 
1
1  
 0g
is an approximation to J in the sense that the left (resp., right) ends of J and J
0
are at
a distance of order O(h), as h! +0.
By using 
0
as an approximation to , and J
0
as an approximation to J , we can simplify
the study of type-II
M
equilibria.
For instance, if a function
F () =
k
1
p
0
(1 M
0
())
1 + 
+
1
1  
is increasing on [0; 1); (3.26)
then J
0
n0 6= ; if and only if F is less than or equal to Q = (u
0
(q

)+1)=u
0
(q

), in some right
neighborhood of 0. Now the following specication of Theorem 3.6 is straightforward.
Theorem 3.10. a) Let (3.26) hold, and
k
1
(1 M) <
1
u
0
(q

)p
0
: (3.27)
Then there exists h
0
> 0 such that if h 2 (0; h
0
] and k  1 + k
1
h, then a type-II
M
equilibrium exist.
b) Let (3.26) hold, and
k
1
(1 M) >
1
u
0
(q

)p
0
: (3.28)
Then there exists h
0
> 0 such that if h 2 (0; h
0
] and k  1 + k
1
h, then a type-II
M
equilibrium does not exist.
Notice that an expression in the LHS in (3.27) and (3.28) is equal to a product of the
level of the ineectiveness, k  1, the inverse trading friction, h
 1
, and 1 M , the defect
of the money supply, i.e. it can be interpreted as the instability index similar to the one
introduced for type-I
M
equilibria in Subsection 2.8; then the RHS in (3.27) and (3.28) is
the instability threshold. We see that it is signicantly lower than the instability threshold
for type-I
M
equilibria, 2(1+u
0
(q

))=(u
0
(q

)p
0
), hence type-II
M
equilibria are more fragile
than type-II
M
equilibria.
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3.6. Comparison of type-II
M
and type-I
M
equilibria.
Theorem 3.11. There exists h
0
> 0 such that if h 2 (0; h
0
] and a type-II
M
equilibrium
exists, then a type-I
M
equilibrium exists as well, and the value function of type-1 agents
in the latter is larger than the one in the former.
Proof. It follows from (3.24){(3.25) and (2.30), that the dierence of the value function
of type-1 agents in type-I
M
equilibrium and the one in type-II
M
equilibrium is equal to
	
0
  
0
() + O(h), where 
0
() is given by (3.25),  is an optimal threshold, of which
we know that  2 J
0
, and
	
0
= q

 
u
0
(q

) + 1
u
0
(q

)
  k
1
p
0
 M
2
!
:
We have
	
0
  
0
() = q

 
(1  )
u
0
(q

) + 1
u
0
(q

)
+ k
1
B()  k
1
p
0
 M
2
 M
1
()
!
;
but  2 J
0
, therefore
(1  )
u
0
(q

) + 1
u
0
(q

)
 k
1
B()(1  ) + 1;
and 	
0
  
0
()  q

[k
1
(B()   (p
0
 M)=2) + 1  M
1
()]: But B()   (p
0
+M)=2 =
p
0
(1 M
0
())=(1+) (p
0
 M)=2 is positive for  2 (0; 1), since p
0
< 1 andM
0
() < M ,
and 1 M
1
() is positive, since M
1
() < 1. 
The reason for a type-II
M
equilibrium to be inferior is a participation constraint (3.3),
which must be satised if 1-sector is to get money from type-0 agents ever: to achieve
the same level of welfare as in a type-I
M
equilibrium, 1-sector must issue notes in large
quantities, but then the relative value of holding money increases, type-0 agents start to
require of type-1 agents too much good in exchange for a unit of money (as compared
to an amount of good which type-1 agents get for a unit of money), so that it becomes
non-optimal for type-1 agents to sell their good for money on such unfavorable conditions.
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4. Appendix: Technical results for type-I
M
equilibria
4.1. Auxiliary results. To simplify our problem, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.1. Let c be a positive constant, and functions u; v : R
+
! R
+
satisfy
u is smooth, increasing and concave, and satises the Inada conditions.
(4.1)
Then functions cu; u+ v; u Æ v and q 7! u(cq) also satisfy (4.1).
Proof. Direct verication. 
Lemma 4.2. If u satises (4.1), then for any c > 0, there exists q > 0 such that
u(q)  cq () q 2 [0; q]: (4.2)
Proof. Evident. 
Lemma 4.3. a) For any tuple (x
0
; x
1
; q
N
) 2 f0; x

g  [0; 1]  (0;+1), there exists a
unique q
0
= q
0
(x
0
; x
1
; q
N
) > 0 satisfying (2.8) and (1.2);
b) q
0
is a smooth function in (x
1
; q
N
);
c) q
0
is an increasing concave function in q
N
, satisfying @q
0
=@q
N
! 0 as q
N
! +1;
d) q
0
! +1 as q
N
! +1, but slower than q
N
:
lim
q
N
!+1
max
x
0
;x
1
q
0
(x
0
; x
1
; q
N
)=q
N
= 0;
e) if x
0
> 0, then there exists  > 0 such that
q
0
(x
0
; x
1
; q
N
)  ; 8 (x
1
; q
N
) 2 [0; 1] (0;+1);
f) if x
0
> 0, then q
0
is decreasing in x
1
, on a set where u(q
0
) > q
0
.
Proof. a) Write (2.8) as (q
0
) = u(q
N
), where
(q) = Aq   Bu(q); A = (h=p
0
+ 1 +B)k; B = p
0
(1 M
0
)x
0
=((1 + )p
1
x

)  0:
If x
0
= 0, then q
0
= u(q
N
)=A satises (4.1) by Lemma 4.1. If x
0
> 0, then B > 0, and

0
(q) = A   Bu
0
(q) < 0 in a suÆciently small right vicinity of 0, due to u
0
(+0) = +1.
Hence, (q) < 0 in some right vicinity of 0. Since u decreases and u
0
(+1) = 0, 
0
has
the only root on (0;+1), call it q^, and it is a simple root. Clearly, (q^) < 0, (q) < 0
on (0; q^), and  increases on (q^;+1). Moreover, (q) ! +1 as q ! +1, hence q
0
,
a solution to (2.8), is unique and satises q
0
(x
1
; q
N
) > ~q(x
1
), where ~q(x
1
) is the root of
(q) = 0.
b) follows from the Implicit Function Theorem.
c) On (~q;+1), 
0
(q) = A   Bu
0
(q) > 0, and "(q) =  Bu"(q) > 0. Hence,  is
convex on (~q;+1), and 
 1
: (0;+1) ! (~q;+1) is increasing and concave. Hence,
q
0
(q) = 
 1
(u(q)) also is.
The second statement is evident since 
0
(q)  A for q large, and u
0
(q
N
) ! 0 as q
N
!
+1.
d) For large q and q
N
, (q) = q + o(q), u(q
N
) = o(q
N
), and d) follows.
e) Evidently, we can set  = min
x
1
~q(x
1
); it is positive by the proof of part a).
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f) By calculating the derivative of an implicit function given by (2.8), we obtain for
q
0
> q^:
@q
0
@x
1
=  
p
0
(1 M
0
)x
0
(x
1
+ x

)
2
p
1
u(q
0
)(A  Bu
0
(q
0
))
 1
:
It is negative on a set, where u(q
0
) > q
0
, since A  Bu
0
(q
0
) > 0 there. 
Lemma 4.4. For all M
0
< 1, x
1
2 [0; 1] and h > 0, a positive solution to (2.9) exists. It
is unique and satises
u(q
m0
) > q
m0
: (4.3)
If x
m0
= 0, then (2.9) has a unique solution q
m0
= 0.
Proof. If x
m0
> 0, then q
m0
> 0 exists and is unique since u satises (4.1); (4.3) is
immediate from (2.9) for q
m0
> 0.
If x
m0
= 0, then q
m0
= 0 is evident from (2.9). 
Proof of (2.13). Since u(0)  0, (4.3) means that in all cases, u(q
m0
)  q
m0
, and then
(2.13) follows from (1.4).
Notice that if q
m1
= 0, then q
m0
> 0 by (1.39), and if q
m1
> 0, then q
m0
> 0 by (4.1).
Proof of (2.14). Suppose, x
0
= 0, then by (1.2), u(q
0
) < q
0
, and by comparing with
(2.2), q
0
< q
N
. On the other hand, (2.12) imply kq
N
 u(q
0
) < q
0
. Since k  1 and
q
N
> 0, we have a contradiction, and x
0
> 0. By (1.2), (2.14) holds.
Denote by Q a set of tuples fq
0
; q
N
; q
m0
; x
1
; V
1
g satisfying all conditions in the denition
of a type-I
M
equilibrium, except for the requirement of maximization of V
1
.
Lemma 4.5. There exists C > 0 such that for all h > 0 and X 2 Q,
q
0
= q
0
(X)  C; q
N
= q
N
(X)  C; q
m0
= q
m0
(X)  C: (4.4)
Proof. Suppose, there exists a sequence (X
n
)
n1
 Q s.t. q
0
(X
n
) ! +1. Then for n
large enough, Lemma 4.3 d) and (2.2) contradict each other. Hence, q
0
 C, therefore by
(2.12), q
N
 C
1
.
Since u satises (4.1), q
m0
 C follows from (2.9) and Lemma 4.2. 
Lemma 4.6. There exists h
0
> 0 such that for h 2 (0; h
0
],
a) the problem of maximization of V
1
is equivalent to the problem of maximization for
a function
(; q
0
; q
N
) =
1
1 + 
[minf1; gu(q
0
)  kq
N
];
b) incentive compatibility constraints (1.30){(1.34) are redundant.
Proof. If 1-sector chooses q
1
= q

, we have u(q

)  kq

> 0, and (2.10) gives V
1
 ch
 1
,
where c > 0 is independent of h > 0. Now, for small h, (4.4) gives b) and proves that this
choice of q
1
is really optimal. Since this q
1
is independent of x
1
and q
N
, a) follows. 
Notice that this proof is valid for type-II
M
equilibria, too.
Lemma 4.7. There exist C; h
0
> 0 s.t. if h 2 (0; h
0
],
q

  Ch  q
0
 q

; q

  Ch  q
N
 q

: (4.5)
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Proof. By (4.4), the LHS in (2.15) is O(h), and B() is bounded away from 0 uniformly
in h since  is bounded. Hence, by using (2.2) and (2.14), we conclude from (2.15), that
0  u(q
0
)   q
0
 Ch and 0  u(q
N
)   q
0
 Ch, where C > 0 is independent of h.
Since  2 (0; 1], part e) of Lemma 4.3 shows that q
0
is bounded away from 0, hence
q
0
! q

, and then q
N
! q

, too. Since u
0
(q

)   1 < 0 and u 2 C
1
, we see that in
a suÆciently small neighborhood of q

, a function q 7! u(q)   q is invertible, and the
inverse, call it f , decreases and has a bounded derivative. By applying f to an estimate
Ch  u(q
0
)  q
0
 0, and using the Lagrange formula, we obtain  C
1
h  q
0
 q

. After
that we have  C
2
h + q

 u(q
N
)  q

. Since u
0
(q

) 6= 0, the inverse u
 1
has a bounded
derivative in a suÆciently small neighborhood of q

. We apply u
 1
to the last inequality,
use the Lagrange formula and nish the proof of (4.5). 
4.2. Proofs of Main Theorems. Proof of Theorem 2.1. If k > 1 is xed, h! +0, and
 remains bounded, then (4.5) holds, and (2.12) implies q

+ O(h)  kq

+ O(h). For
small h, this is impossible.
Proofs of Theorems 2.2 and 2.3. By Lemma 4.7, q
0
and q
N
are in small vicinity of q

.
For these q
0
and q
N
, and   C, we prove two useful estimates. Since u 2 C
1
((0;+1))
and u
0
(q

) < 1, we conclude from (4.5), that there exist c > 0 and h
0
> 0 s.t. if h 2 (0; h
0
]
then
u
0
(q
0
)  1  c; u
0
(q
N
)  1  c: (4.6)
Further, let  be from the proof of Lemma 4.3:
(q
0
; ) = [(p
1
+ h)q
0
+ p
0
(1 M
0
)(q
0
  u(q
0
))=(1 + )]=p
1
:
Then
@
@q
0
=
p
1
+ h + p
0
(1 M
0
)(1  u
0
(q
0
))=(1 + )
p
1
:
Since  is bounded, 1=(1 + ) is bounded away from zero, and by using (4.6), we obtain
@
@q
0
 1 + c; (4.7)
where c > 0 is independent of h 2 (0; h
0
], and h
0
> 0 is suÆciently small. By using (4.6)
and (4.7), we obtain (for small h, as in all estimates below):
u
0
(q
0
)
@q
0
@q
N
= u
0
(q
0
)u
0
(q
N
)
 
@
@q
0
!
 1
< 1;
therefore
@
@q
N
=
1
1 + 
[minf1; gu
0
(q
0
)
@q
0
@q
N
  k] <
minf1; g   k
1 + 
< 0:
It follows that an optimal X cannot be an interior point, and a constraint (2.12) is non-
binding in a sense that we may decrease q
N
without violating (2.12). Since
@(u(q
0
)  q
0
)
@q
N
= (u
0
(q
0
)  1)
@q
0
@q
N
< 0;
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a constraint u(q
0
)  q
0
is non-binding as well: we may decrease q
N
if we are at this part
of the boundary, and increase . Finally,
@(u(q
N
)  q
0
)
@q
N
= u
0
(q
N
) 
@q
0
@q
N
=
= u
0
(q
N
)  u
0
(q
N
)
 
@
@q
0
!
 1
= u
0
(q
0
)
0
@
1 
 
@
@q
0
!
 1
1
A
> 0;
therefore the maximum of  is attained when u(q
N
) = q
0
, i.e. (2.24) hold. From (2.15),
we obtain an equation for q
0
= q
0
():
hq
0
=
p
0
(1 M
0
)
1 + 
[u(q
0
)  q
0
]: (4.8)
Now we are going to show that  < 1 cannot be an optimal choice. For  2 (0; 1], dene
() = (; q
0
; u
 1
(q
0
)) =

1 + 
[u(q
0
)  ku
 1
(q
0
)];
where q
0
= q
0
() is given as a (unique) positive solution to (4.8). By dierentiating (4.8),
we obtain
(h+ p
0
(1 M
0
)[1  u
0
(q
0
)]=(1 + ))q
0
0
=
p
0
(1 M
0
)
(1 + )
2
[q
0
  u(q
0
)]:
Since u 2 C
1
, (4.5) implies that the RHS is O(h), and by (4.6),
(h+ p
0
(1 M
0
)[1  u
0
(q
0
)])=(1 + ))  c;
where c > 0 is independent of h 2 (0; h
0
]. Hence,
q
0
0
= O(h): (4.9)
By (4.6), 1  u
0
(q
0
) > 0, and since q
0
  u(q
0
) < 0,
q
0
0
() < 0: (4.10)
We calculate

0
() =
1
(1 + )
2
[u(q
0
)  ku
 1
(q
0
)] +

1 + 
[u
0
(q
0
) 
k
u
0
(u
 1
(q
0
))
]q
0
0
():
Since k  1, u
 1
(q
0
) = q

+O(h), and u
0
(q

) 2 (0; 1), (4.6) implies, for small h > 0,
u
0
(q
0
)  k=u
0
(u
 1
(q
0
)) < 0:
By (2.12), we consider only q
0
for which u(q
0
)  ku
 1
(q
0
)  0 holds, then (4.10) and the
last estimate give 
0
() > 0. Thus, if  < 1, we may enlarge it and obtain a larger value
of ; a condition u(q
0
)  q
0
remains intact, due to (4.8).
Thus, in an equilibrium (if it exists at all) we must have  = 1, then (4.8) reduces to
(2.23), and (2.23) requires that (2.26) hold.
This proves statements in parts a) { c) of Theorem 2.2 and corresponding statements
in the "if" part of Theorem 2.3 about q
0
; q
N
and . To prove that q
m0
= q
0
, note that
under condition (2.23), equations (2.15) and (2.16) are identical, each possessing the only
positive root.
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Since u satises (4.1), and u(q
0
) > q
0
by (2.23), we have q
0
< q

, and after that q
N
< q
0
follows from (2.1) and (4.1). By applying (4.1) once again, we obtain q

< q

, and then
for small h, (4.5) gives q

< q
N
< q
0
. Also, (4.5) implies that q
0
! q

and q
N
! q

as
h! 0.
This proves parts d) and e) of Theorem 2.2 and corresponding statements in the "if"
part of Theorem 2.3.
It remains to prove the "only if" part of Theorem 2.3. If u(q
0
(1)) ku
 1
(q
0
(1)) < 0, then
there is no equilibrium since (2.12) is violated for any  2 (0; 1]: u(q
0
()) ku
 1
(q
0
()) <
0. To see this, consider curves y = u(q) and y = ku
 1
(q). By our assumption, on
(q
0
(1);+1), the latter is above the former, but q
0
() increases as  decreases.
Thus, Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 have been proved.
Finally, to prove (2.28), it suÆces to calculate the rst two terms of the asymptotics
of q
0
= q
0
(h) as h ! +0 (from (2.23)), then from (2.24) { the rst two terms of the
asymptotics of q
N
= q
N
(q
0
(h)), and substitute into (2.10). By dierentiating (2.23), we
nd q
0
0
(0) = 2q

=(p(u
0
(q

)   1)), where p = p
0
(1  M
0
), and then (2.24) gives q
0
N
(0) =
(u
 1
)
0
(q

)q
0
0
(0). Hence,
p
0
(1 M
0
)
1 + 
[u(q
0
)  kq
N
] =
=
p
2
[q

+hu
0
(q

)
2q

p(u
0
(q

)  1)
+O(h
2
)  q

(1+ k
1
h) h(u
 1
)
0
(q

)
2q

p(u
0
(q

)  1)
 O(h
2
)] =
= hq

(u
0
(q

)  1=u
0
(q

))=(u
0
(q

)  1)  hk
1
q

p=2 +O(h
2
) =
= hq

(1 + u
0
(q

))=u
0
(q

)  hk
1
q

p=2 +O(h
2
);
and (2.28) follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. Set
~
h = 2h=(p
0
(1 M
0
)) and notice that
1) q
0
= q
0
(
~
h) is a unique positive solution to an equation (1 +
~
h)q = u(q);
2) an optimization problem for 1-sector is equivalent to: on
~
h 2 [0;
~
h
0
], where
~
h
0
> 0 is
small, maximize
	(
~
h) =
1
~
h
(
~
h);
where
(
~
h) = u(q
0
(
~
h))  u
 1
(q
0
(
~
h)) = q
0
(
~
h)  u
 1
(q
0
(
~
h)) + q
0
(
~
h):
By using equalities q
0
(0) = u
 1
(q
0
(0)) = q

and the Implicit Function Theorem, we can
nd 	(0) = 0, and calculate explicitly 
0
(0) and "(0); after that, using inequalities
u
0
(q

) > 0 and u"(q

) < 0, we check that "(0) < 0 (calculations are standard, lengthy
and available on request). Now, by using the Taylor formula in the neighborhood of 0,
we obtain
	(
~
h) = 
0
(0) +
~
h"(0)=2 + o(
~
h):
It follows that 	 decreases in a neighborhood of 0. When h is small, and M
0
is bounded
away from 1,
~
h is small as well, so the last formula is applicable. If h is xed and M
decreases,
~
h decreases as well, hence 	(
~
h(M)) increases.
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5. Appendix: Technical results for type-II
M
equilibria
Proof of Lemma 3.2. By (1.2), both statements are equivalent.
From (3.7) and (3.11), it follows that h=(1   N  M
0
) ! 0 as  ! 0, and therefore
(1.27) gives that u(q
m0
) q
m0
! 0 and u(q
m1
) q
m0
! 0 as ! 0. If we take into account
(3.5), then we obtain q
m0
 q

; q
m1
 q

as  ! 0, where q

is a unique positive root of
an equation u(q) = q.
If x
m1
> 0, then from (1.8), we conclude that u(q
0
) = o(1), and then q
0
= o(u(q
0
)).
Hence, u(q
0
) > q
0
.
Suppose, x
m1
= 0 and u(q
0
) < q
0
; then
1) x
0
= 0, and from (1.26), q
N
= u
 1
[(1 + h=p
1
)
 1
q
0
]; and
2) a subsystem (1.27), (1.29) uniquely denes q
m1
and q
m0
as functions of ; both are
independent of q
N
and q
0
. We conclude, that for  xed, 1-sector chooses q
N
{ equivalently,
q
0
, { to maximize
(q
0
) = u(q
0
)  ku
 1
[(1 + h=p
1
)
 1
q
0
];
s.t. u(q
0
) < q
0
. But it is easy to see that where u(q
0
) < q
0
and (q
0
)  0,  decreases,
and q 7! q   u(q) increases, hence neither q
0
with u(q
0
) < q
0
can be optimal, and our
assumption has lead to a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Since   1=x

and (3.7) hold, we have, as ! 0:
from (1.26) and (3.11):
u(q
0
)  q
0
= O(); u(q
N
)  q
0
= O(); (5.1)
from (1.27) and (3.11):
u(q
m0
)  q
m0
= O(); u(q
m1
)  q
m0
= O(): (5.2)
Consider separately two cases:   1, and  2 (0; 1).
If   1, then x
m1
= x
m1
+ x
+
m1
= x

, and from (1.29) and (3.11) we conclude that
kq
m1
= u(q
m0
)  u(q
0
) +O(): (5.3)
If q
0
! 0, then u(q
0
)=q
0
! +1, which contradicts (1.26) in view of (3.11). Hence, from
(5.1), q
0
= q

+O(), and q
N
= q

+O(). Similarly, (3.5) and (5.2) give q
m0
= q

+O()
and q
m1
= q

+O(). But then (5.3) implies q
m1
= O(), a contradiction.
Hence,  2 (0; 1). For these , we have similarly to (5.1){(5.3)
u(q
0
)  q
0
= O(h); u(q
N
)  q
0
= O(h); (5.4)
u(q
m0
)  q
m0
= O(h); u(q
m1
)  q
m0
= O(h); (5.5)
kq
m1
= u(q
m1
)  u(q
m0
) +O(h): (5.6)
(5.4){(5.5) give
Q = q

+O(h); 8 Q 2 fq
0
; q
N
; q
m0
; q
m1
g; (5.7)
and since k  1 and  < 1, (5.6) and (5.7) are compatible only if k   1 = O(h) and
 = O(h). If x
m0
> 0, we can use (5.7) and rewrite (1.8) as
u(q
0
)  u(q
0
) +O(h);
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from (5.7), we see that O(h)  q

+ O(h). For suÆciently small h, this is impossible.
Thus, x
m0
= 0, and Lemma 3.3 has been proved.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. a) and b) If 1-sector chooses q
1
= q

, we have u(q

)   kq

> 0,
and (3.18) gives V
1
 ch
 1
, where c > 0 is independent of h > 0. Now, for small h, (5.7)
gives b) and proves that this choice of q
1
is really optimal. Since this q
1
is independent
of x
1
and q
N
, a) follows.
c) Since x
m1
= 0, (1.8) reduces to u(q
m0
)  kq
m1
< u(q
0
), which holds due to (5.7).
d) The proof is the same as the rst part of the proof of Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 in
Subsection 4.2.
Lemma 3.5 has been proved.
Proof of Theorem 3.6 c). This is (5.7).
Proof of Theorem 3.7. From (5.7), there exist C
1
and h
0
> 0 such that for h 2 (0; h
0
]
and  2 [0; 1),
()  C
1
+ h
 1
(1  k)q

:
If C > C
1
=q

and k  1 + Ch, () < 0, hence it is not optimal to issue notes.
Proof of Lemma 3.9. On the strength of (5.7), we look for q
0
; q
N
; q
m0
and q
m1
in the
form
q
0
= q

(1 + q
01
h+O(h
2
)); q
N
= q

(1 + q
N1
h +O(h
2
)); (5.8)
q
m0
= q

(1 + q
m01
h +O(h
2
)); q
m1
= q

(1 + q
m11
h+O(h
2
)): (5.9)
By substituting (5.8) into (3.21), using the Taylor formula around h = 0, and equating
terms of order h, we obtain
q

=B() + (1  u
0
(q

))q

q
01
= 0;
hence
q
01
= 1=((u
0
(q

)  1)B()): (5.10)
By using (5.8) once again, we nd
q
N
= u
 1
(q
0
) = q

+ (u
 1
)
0
(q

)(q
0
  q

) +O(h
2
) =
= q

(1 + hq
01
=u
0
(q

) +O(h
2
)): (5.11)
By using (5.9), we deduce from (3.22)
q
m11
=  k
1
 
1
B()(1  )
+ u
0
(q

)q
m01
: (5.12)
Introduce the notation
D() =
p
1
(1 M
1
)
p
0
(1 M
0
)
(1 + ); G() =
1
B()(1  )
:
From (3.22) and (5.12), we derive
(1 +D() + hB()
 1
)q

(1 + hq
m01
) +O(h
2
) =
= q

(1 + hu
0
(q

)q
m01
+D()(1 + hu
0
(q

)( k
1
 G() + u
0
(q

)q
m01
)) +O(h
2
):
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After simplication, we obtain
(u
0
(q

)  1)q
m01
(1 +D()(1 + u
0
(q

))) = B()
 1
+D()u
0
(q

)(k
1
+G());
hence
q
m01
=
B()
 1
+D()u
0
(q

)(k
1
+G())
(u
0
(q

)  1)(1 +D()(1 + u
0
(q

)))
(5.13)
By using (5.8){(5.11), we deduce (2.24){(2.25).
Similarly, from (5.12){(5.13),
h
 1
(u(q
m1
)  q
m0
)) = q

(u
0
(q

)q
m11
  q
m01
) +O(h) =
= q

[u
0
(q

)( k
1
 G() + u
0
(q

)q
m01
)  q
m01
] +O(h) =
= q

[(u
0
(q

)
2
  1)q
m01
  u
0
(q

)(k
1
+G())] +O(h) =
=
q

D()u
0
(q

)(k
1
+G()) +B()
 1
1 +D()(1 + u
0
(q

))
 (u
0
(q

) + 1)  u
0
(q

)(k
1
+G()) +O(h) =
=
q

u
0
(q

)
B()(1 +D()(1 + u
0
(q

))
"
u
0
(q

) + 1
u
0
(q

)
  (k
1
+G())B()
#
+O(h) =
=
q

u
0
(q

)
B()(1 +D()(1 + u
0
(q

))
"
u
0
(q

) + 1
u
0
(q

)
  k
1
B() 
1
1  
#
+O(h);
and parts b){c) of Lemma follow.
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Possible Extensions and Ramifications
By using our model as a benchmark, it is possible to introduce additional frictions
and/or externalities.
For instance, it is straightforward to modify the model so that
1) an exogenous probability of a note to become worthless is given;
2) taxation in a form of exogenous probability of a unit of money to be taken away by
a government agent is introduced;
3) ineective agents may pay some cost of restructuring and become type-0 agents;
4) type-0 agents are more mobile, so that a Poisson rate of arrival of meetings "type-0{
type-0" is larger than the one of meetings "type-0{type-1", and the latter is larger than
the one of meetings "type-1{type-1";
5) a type-0 agent can invest in her ability to nd trading partners, i.e. to pay for an
increase of the Poisson rate of arrival of her trading partners.
The following possibilities are also feasible but more diÆcult.
It is very interesting to analyze how the economy react to some shocks, i.e. to consider a
dynamic model for small uctuations around a steady state found in this paper. Especially
interesting would be to analyze the dependence of the welfare on the size of the note-issuing
sector since it is a source of endogenous supply of liquidity in the economy.
It is also possible to consider a stochastic dynamical model (also for small uctuations),
when some exogenous factors, like the money supply, level of taxes and/or parameters
characterizing u evolve stochastically, and analyze how this uncertainty aects the decision
to restructure.
Finally, it would be very interesting to develop corresponding models with many levels
of ineectiveness; in the pure monetary case, it has been done in Boyarchenko (1999).
Conclusion
We have considered an economy where
1. There are two sectors: a sector of ineective agents (1-sector) who can collude
and issue universally accepted notes (inside money), and a sector of eective agents who
cannot collude and issue universally accepted notes.
2. There may be genuine money (outside money) as well, and there may be none, so that
only notes are circulating (we consider such economies in Boyarchenko and Levendorski

i
(1999); in Boyarchenko (1999), pure monetary economy with heterogeneous agents is
considered).
3. Even inside each sector, agents are heterogeneous in a sense that they have idiosyn-
cratic tastes for goods, and they specialize in production, too.
We have introduced such characteristics of the trading process as the trading friction,
and showed that essential properties of equilibria and the very existence of the equilibria
strongly depend on the trading friction, the ineectiveness of agents of 1-sector, the money
supply and the degree of specialization in consumption.
We classied possible equilibria when the trading friction is small, and made a series of
policy recommendations. In particular, we have shown that if the friction is small, and
the agents are rather ineective, then only equilibria with bad properties (too many notes
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in circulation and too low level of production) are possible, if there remains the trade
between sectors; if, in addition, agents are not very picky, then an equilibrium with the
trade between sectors does not exist at all.
If agents are suÆciently eective and the trading friction is small then there may exist
one or both of the following equilibria:
1. an equilibrium where there are no money ows between the two sectors because
1-sector nds it optimal to produce only zero quantities of good for money (type-I
M
equilibrium), and
2. an equilibrium where both money and notes are used in trades between the two
sectors, a special case being a pure monetary economy (type-II
M
equilibrium).
We have shown that if the trading friction is very small, then type-II
M
equilibria are
inferior from the point of view of the welfare of 1-sector, hence it would not use money
unless forced by some exogenous (from the point of view of the model) factor, like the
necessity to pay taxes with money (to treat this situation consistently, our model should be
modied). This agrees with previous ndings by N.Wallace and others about superiority
of inside money to outside money (see Introduction).
Nevertheless, if the trading friction is not very small, and type-1 agents are fairly
eective, then a type-II
M
equilibrium is superior for them.
We have introduced the instability index and instability threshold and showed that type-
II
M
equilibria are more fragile than type-I
M
equilibria in the sense that the instability
threshold for the former is lower than that for the latter.
Finally, we analyzed possible eects of an increase (decrease) of the money supply and
showed that
1. At small levels of money supply, its increase can lead to a revitalization of a signicant
part of eectively dead ineective type-1 agents, which improves the welfare of eective
agents, and conversely, a small decrease of the money supply may result in a signicant
part of the economy to become isolated from the rest of it and a source of an additional
liquidity to disappear, which leads to decrease of the welfare of eective agents.
2. Similar eects are observed when the trading friction decreases and increases, and/or
the utility of consumption increases and decreases (due to some taste shock, say), respec-
tively.
3. At moderately high levels of money supply, an increase of the money supply leads to
an improvement of the welfare of rather ineective 1-sector, but if it is eective, it would
rather have no money in economy at all. For agents of 0-sector, the eect of the increase
may be positive or negative, the last possibility realizing when a fairly eective part of
1-sector starts to use money, and not only notes, as they do at low levels of the money
supply.
4. At high levels of money supply, the welfare of all agents decreases when the money
supply grows.
5. Starting from not very high levels of the money supply, type-0 agents would be
better o if they stop trade with the note-issuing sector at all, and live by themselves;
however, in order to realize this possibility, they must be able to collude, which is not the
case, { or a policy maker must eectively forbid the notes. An economy would continue
to use notes, if left alone.
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6. A decrease of the trading friction makes everybody better o { but only in a region
where type-1 agents remain alive for 0-sector. When they eectively die, the welfare of
0-agents drops.
7. If 1-sector is eective and the trading friction is small, then an optimal money supply
from the point of view of 1-sector is 0, and the same holds for small positive levels of the
ineectiveness, k   1. If k   1 is not small, there exists a positive level of money supply
which is optimal from the point of view of 1-sector.
If the existing money supply is at or above an optimal level, there is a strong incentive
for 1-sector to transfer new money out of the economy, should the new money arrive (by
making an agreement to sell their goods for money though it is not optimal in a steady
state; to treat this eect properly, one has to modify the model and make it a sort of a
model of a small open economy.) This observation may provide an additional explanation
for the capital ight. The more eective 1-sector, the lower an optimal amount of the
money in the economy for this sector, hence the larger the incentive for the capital ight.
Policy conclusions
In an economy with rather ineective 1-sector, at low levels of the money supply, a
policy maker can eectively control the size of the ineective sector by
decreasing the money supply and/or improving the infrastructure (i.e. making the trad-
ing friction smaller), if she wishes the ineective agents to die (in the sense isolated from
the rest of an economy; if we introduce the taxation into the model, they will become
bankrupt), or
increasing the money supply and creating some articial obstacles for eective trade
(i.e. making the trading friction larger), if she wishes them to remain alive.
Notice that in the present model, where we do not consider a possibility of restructuring,
the rst course of actions leads to a steep drop of the welfare of eective agents, and the
second one { to a jump.
By choosing her policy, a policy maker should be aware of a snow-balling eect: when a
change of money supply causes the size of an alive part of an ineective note-issuing sector
to increase or decrease, the latter may continue to do so and increase (resp., decrease) to
unforseen, and, perhaps, undesirable levels.
A policy maker cannot make an economy to stop using notes by increasing the money
supply to high levels: though eective type-0 agents would be better o if they stop
trading with ineective agents and using notes, they could not change the type of the
equilibrium since they cannot collude.
So, if a policy maker wishes to get rid of notes, without causing large welfare losses, she
must simultaneously increase the money supply and eectively forbid the usage of notes,
by creating some articial obstacles to the usage.
From the point of view of our model, the most natural thing to do is the simultaneous
 increase of the money supply;
 demonopolization of note-issuing large rms, like Gazprom and UES { notes of
smaller rms are less acceptable, and
 heavy taxation of intermediaries involved in organizing of barter chains.
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Finally, the investment in the energy sector (a core of the sector of colluding agents) at
the expense of restructured enterprises of 0-sector may have a side-eect: an additional
incentive for the capital ight.
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Fig.3.1. Gains from trade with 0−sector, for type−1 agents (h=0.025, d=1, β=0.3, p1=0.3) 
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Fig.3.2. Weighted value function of type−0 agents (h=0.025, d=1, β=0.3, p1=0.3) 
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Fig.3.3. Gains from trade with 1−sector, for type−0 agents (h=0.025, d=1, β=0.3, p1=0.3) 
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Fig.3.4. Amount produced by a type−0 seller for a note (h=0.025, d=1, β=0.3, p1=0.3) 
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Fig.3.5. Amount redeemed for a note by a type−1 agent (h=0.025, d=1, β=0.3, p1=0.3) 
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Fig.3.6. Amount produced by a type−0 seller for a unit of money (h=0.025, d=1, β=0.3, p1=0.3) 
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Fig.3.7. Amount produced by a type−1 seller for a unit of money (h=0.025, d=1, β=0.3, p1=0.3) 
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